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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to reconcile two theoretical perspectives: nondescriptivist approaches 
to metaethics, and propositional approaches to semantic content. Metaethical 
nondescriptivism maintains that moral language is in some important sense 
nondescriptive or nonrepresentational. Fundamentally, such language does not serve to 
describe how the world is. Rather, it should be understood in terms of its nondescriptive 
functional role in our cognitive economy and social intercourse. It is often thought that 
nondescriptivism implies the denial of moral propositions or propositional contents. 
That is, it denies that moral sentences have propositions as their contents, that moral 
propositions are the objects of attitudes such as belief, and that there are moral 
propositions that are true or false. This denial leads to a number of very serious 
problems in providing an adequate account of the semantics of moral language. This 
thesis argues that the nondescriptivist should reject the assumption that 
nondescriptivism implies denying moral propositions a place in one's theory of moral 
language. This assumption presupposes a descriptive or representational conception of 
propositions that is unavailable to the nondescriptivist. The nondescriptivist should 
therefore accommodate moral propositions by providing a suitably nondescriptive 
conception of propositions. The thesis examines in detail three recent attempts in the 
literature to realise this reconciliation. It is argued that none of the approaches are 
successful. However, it is nonetheless suggested that the discussion highlights how the 
nondescriptivist has a wide range of theoretical resources with which to argue for 
propositional nondescriptivism, providing possible grounds for optimism. 
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~ 1 ~ 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is about moral language. It is about words like 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 
'wrong', and the sentences in which they appear. Moral language has puzzled 
philosophers. As one writer has it, moral words are Janus-faced. Looking to the past, 
perhaps, these words display their descriptive nature. When I claim that it is wrong for 
politicians to take cash for questions, I seem describe how matters stand. My description 
of the moral aspect of cash for questions is something that I can believe, doubt, perhaps 
even know. On the other hand, when I make this claim, I am not merely stating how 
things stand. Rather, I am expressing my condemnation towards those who take cash 
for questions, perhaps in the hope that you will come to share my attitude, or even to 
deter you from engaging in such actions. Moreover, I seem to do so simply by using a 
word like 'wrong'. I do not need to do anything additional to indicate my stance on the 
matter, or to say the word in any particular way. So looking to the future, perhaps, 
moral words display their nondescriptive nature. 
In a more theoretical vain, we might say that while moral terms seem to have a 
straightforwardly descriptive semantics, they have a distinctively nondescriptive 
functional role. These days, philosophers generally acknowledge that any theory of moral 
language needs to account for both aspects. But it is often thought that they are in 
tension. While in the old days one could get away with simply denying one of these 
aspects, it is now generally accepted that both require explanation. Very crudely, we can 
distinguish between descriptivist theories that take the descriptive nature of moral 
language to be fundamental, and nondescriptivist theories that take the nondescriptive 
nature of moral langauge to be fundamental. Things are in fact a lot more complex than 
this, but it's a helpful starting point nonetheless. 
The focus on this thesis is metaethical nondescriptivism.1 I argue that 
nondescriptivism is at least in principle compatible with the standard semantic 
resources often thought to be available only to descriptivism. The resources in question 
are propositional and truth-conditional semantics. Many people define 
nondescriptivism as the thesis that moral terms do not express a propositional or truth-
conditional content. However, this is over-simplistic and need not be accepted. The idea 
                                                          
1 Nondescriptivism can be applied to a variety of different domains. Throughout, I will use the term as 
shorthand for 'metaethical nondescriptivism' unless otherwise specified. Context should make it clear 
in any case how it is being used. 
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that it must presupposes an assumption about the nature of propositional content that 
the nondescriptivist may well reject. This is the assumption that propositional content is 
essentially representational, in some substantive sense to be specified. I argue that it is 
open to the nondescriptivist to adopt a suitably nonrepresentational conception of 
propositional content. By doing so, she can accept an orthodox semantics for moral 
terms while retaining a distinctively nondescriptivist metaethics.   
One of the themes of this thesis is that one cannot get too far in philosophy by 
arguing and theorising at such a general level of abstraction―that is, by "hypothesising 
into the blue". Much of the body of the work will therefore be dedicated to examining 
developed theories that exploit this argumentative move, or at least something like it. 
While I will not end up recommending any of the theories discussed here, lessons will 
be learned about which aspects of which theories provide promise, and which do not. 
Only recently has the idea that nondescriptivism and orthodox semantics might be 
compatible gained serious traction. As such, the approach is still in its infancy, braving 
its first steps. While we will see that establishing those first confident steps is a difficult 
and complex task, I believe that the resourcefulness displayed by the theories examined 
gives promise to possibility of such a theory being realised. 
 
1.1 Semantic Nondescriptivism 
 
While nondescriptivism is primarily a thesis about moral language, its motivations and 
aspirations are more holistic. This thesis is primarily concerned with language, but I will 
use this section to sketch some of the more general attractions of the position. As well as 
hopefully showing why nondescriptivism is worth the bother in the first place, we will 
later see that these considerations give rise to criteria of adequacy for any 
nondescriptivist theory. 
Beginning at perhaps the beginning,2 consider the following statement of 
nondescriptivism about moral language:  
 
This peculiar use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. When so used the word 
stands for nothing whatever, and has no symbolic function. Thus, when we so use it in the 
sentence, 'This is good,' we merely refer to this, and the addition of 'is good' makes no 
difference whatever to our reference. When on the other hand, we say 'This is red,' the 
addition of 'is red' to 'this' does symbolise an extension of our reference, namely, to some 
other red thing. But 'is good' has no comparable symbolic function; it serves only as an emotive 
sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or 
inciting them to actions of one kind or another. (Ogden and Richards 1923: 125) 
 
                                                          
2 “I must confess that I had read The Meaning of Meaning some years before I wrote Language, Truth and 
Logic, but I believe that my plagiarism was unconscious” (Ayer 1984: 28) 
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'Peculiar' here simply refers to the fact that the word 'good' has many other applications 
outside the moral domain. We are primarily concerned here and throughout with the 
moral use. 
In this passage, there are at least three claims about moral language that we can 
distinguish. First, we have the negative claim that moral language is not 'symbolic'. In 
our current terminology, we can say that it is nondescriptive or nonrepresentational.3 
Second, we have the positive claim that moral langauge is expressive, in the sense that 
its function is to express our attitudes or mental states. Although it is only implicit in the 
above passage, we can also distinguish a third positive claim that the kind of attitude 
expressed by moral language is a nonrepresentational conative or desire-like attitude. 
This is in contrast to a representational attitude such as belief.  
Nondescriptivism is standardly understood to be a semantic view about the meaning 
of moral terms. Whereas the meaning of perceptual terms, such as 'red', are predicative 
and can be given in terms their extension or of the property they refer to, moral terms, 
such as 'good', have some other kind of meaning. Call this thesis semantic 
nondescriptivism. Semantic nondescriptivism tells us nothing positive about what 
moral terms mean. Given that we use moral terms a great deal in everyday discussion, it 
seems implausible to say that these words have no significance whatsoever (even if they 
are not 'literally meaningful')4. So nondescriptivism is usually supplemented with a 
positive thesis about the kind of meaning that moral terms do have. The dominant 
approach is to give the meaning of moral expressions in terms of the 
nonrepresentational attitudes or mental states that we use moral words to express. 
Strictly speaking, semantic nondescriptivism consists only of the negative claim. 
However, for simplicity, I'll often use the term to capture all three claims.5 
It seems undeniable that moral terms are generally used to express 
nonrepresentational states, such as condemnation, approbation, resentment, guilt, pride, 
and so on. But the descriptivist need not disagree with this. Her disagreement with the 
semantic nondescriptivist is over the claim that the meaning of moral terms consists in 
their being used to express these attitudes. So what is gained by semantic 
nondescriptivism? To answer this question, we need to look to metaethics more 
generally.  
Consider the following suggestion of the explanatory scope of metaethics: 
  
Understanding the commitments of ordinary moral or value discourse and practice would 
appear to involve accounts of at least the following: the semantics of the language of morals 
and value; the apparent metaphysical status of moral properties or values; the putative 
                                                          
3 I will treat 'descriptive' and 'representational' as more or less synonymous throughout. 
4 c.f. Ayer (1946: 107). 
5 Kalderon (2005) emphasises the importance of recognising that these are distinct claims. For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, we can ignore these issues. 
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epistemology of morality or value theory; and the relation of morality or values to practical 
reasoning. (Darwall, Gibbard and Railton 1992: 127) 
 
As these writers go on to note, these questions are all interconnected. How one accounts 
for one aspect will have implications for how one accounts for others. I think that 
semantic nondescriptivism can be helpfully thought of as taking moral semantics as its 
starting point, and then proceeding to account for the other aspects of moral practice in 
terms of its semantics.  
Nondescriptivism is usually born out of a general philosophical naturalism. This is 
best seen as a sort of methodological naturalism rather than any single thesis or cluster 
of theses.6 On this view, philosophy is constrained by the natural sciences―particularly 
physics, chemistry, biology―in terms of what kind of ontology it is acceptable to posit 
in one's theory (i.e., only those entities posited by the natural sciences).7 Philosophy is 
also constrained in terms of what sciences tells us about ourselves as natural creatures in 
a natural environment: 
 
To be a naturalist is to see human beings as frail complexes of perishable tissue, and so part of 
the natural order. It is thus to refuse unexplained appeals to mind or spirit, and unexplained 
appeals to knowledge of a Platonic order of Forms or Norms; it is above all to refuse any 
appeal to a supernatural order." (Blackburn 1998: 48-9)  
 
Of course, there are many ways of being a naturalist, and no sensible non-naturalist 
would leave any appeal to a non-natural order as 'unexplained'. But here at least is a 
starting point for theorising in general. 
One of main attractions of nondescriptivism is its metaphysical and epistemological 
solvency.8 The characteristic move of nondescriptivism is to argue that a demand for an 
explanation of the metaphysics and epistemology of morality is premised on a 
misunderstanding about moral language. Consider the term 'good'. If we use 'good' to 
refer to a property in the world, then presumably we are owed some account of the 
nature of this property and how it can be 'placed' or 'located' in the natural world. For 
goodness is not obviously the kind of thing that is delivered to the senses or revealed by 
natural science (though one might argue either of these points).  
Supposing that it is, by what sort of means or mechanism do we come to know about 
or even talk about these properties? The cognitive sciences provide detailed 
explanations of the mechanisms by which we perceive the world through sense 
perception. However, while it might be commonplace to say that we can sometimes just 
'see' the wrongness of an action or the goodness of person, we do not have a 'moral 
                                                          
6 c.f. Railton (1989) on between 'methodological' and 'substantive' naturalism, and Price (2013) on 
'subject' and 'object' naturalism. 
7 Note that banning non-natural entities in one's explanatory theory is not necessarily the same as 
banning non-natural entities in other contexts. See below and §3.5.2. 
8 The phrase is Miller's (2013). 
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faculty' akin to sense perception. More plausibly it is simply another way of saying that 
we have the capacity to make moral judgments, which is itself the very thing we are 
trying to explain.  
Semantic nondescriptivism, on the other hand, seems to sidestep these awkward 
questions entirely. For recall that 'good' is not used to refer to a property. Rather, it is 
used to express our sentiments. As 'good' does not purport to represent anything in the 
world, it is simply a mistake to try and provide a metaphysics of what 'good' refers to. 
To think that any such account is owed is to mistake the meaning and function of the 
moral terms. A fortiori, no epistemological account of how we could have cognitive 
access to the moral domain is required either. This is not to say, however, that our moral 
practices are in any way mistaken―that slavery is not really wrong, for example, 
because 'wrong' merely expresses a noncognitive attitude. Slavery is wrong, and we can 
even say that this is objectively true. However, to say as much is to take an ethical 
stance, not to describe a way that the world is. If semantic nondescriptivism is correct, 
then there is simply no 'external' sense in which our moral claims 'hook up with' the 
natural world. 
These reasons also explain the advantages of nondescriptivism over so called error-
theories. According to such views, while moral language is descriptive, and so terms 
like 'good' purport to refer to some property of goodness, no such properties actually 
exist.9 As such, all (positive) moral claims turn out to by systematically false. So my 
claim that slavery is wrong is in fact false, as there simply are no moral states of affairs 
in which wrongness is instantiated to make my claim true. Like nondescriptivism, error-
theories are both naturalistically acceptable and metaphysically and epistemologically 
solvent. So error-theory is attractive for reasons similar to nondescriptivism. 
However, given the choice, it seems preferable to opt for a theory that does not 
render such a commonplace practice systematically mistaken. Not only does this seem 
to offend common sense. From a theoretical perspective, if there we have two competing 
interpretations of a practice, one of which interprets the practice as systematically 
mistaken, then the principle of charity tells us to accept the interpretation that does not. 
The theoretical point is all the more strengthened when we see that error-theorists 
usually explain the existence and purpose of moral discourse in terms of its social 
function. If moral discourse does indeed have this function, then it seems more plausible 
to explain the practice primarily in terms of this function rather than primarily in terms 
of some erroneous representational function.10 
So nondescriptivism is acceptably naturalistic, metaphysically and epistemologically 
solvent, and provides a vindicatory explanation of folk moral practice.11 Though this is 
                                                          
9 The locus classicus is Mackie (1977). 
10 Blackburn (1993a). 
11 Quietist descriptivist approaches such as Dworkin (1996) would also claim to have metaphysical and 
epistemological solvency. There is a delicate question as to how best to characterise the difference 
between these positions and nondescriptivism. However, the nondescriptivist might argue for her 
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more controversial, many nondescriptivists argue that descriptivism (both naturalist 
and non-naturalist varieties) faces serious problems in explaining the distinctive 
directive role of moral judgments (the mental states expressed by moral statements). 
There seems to be a strong connection between moral judgment and motivation to 
action. For example, say that I sincerely claim that stealing is wrong, yet I often steal 
things, absent of weakness of will, being a kleptomaniac, etc. You ask me if I really do 
believe that stealing is wrong, seeing as I have no qualms with stealing. I reply that I do 
sincerely believe that stealing is wrong, and that this gives me a reason not to 
steal―however, these considerations do not move me and I feel no compulsion against 
stealing.  
Something seems to have gone wrong here. What is the nature of the mistake? Some 
have argued that there is a conceptual connection between moral terms and being 
motivated to act. In the above example, I would have misused or misunderstood the 
concept of wrongness, and so would have failed to make a genuine moral judgment. 
Alternatively, one might maintain that making a moral claim rationally commits one to 
be motivated to act accordingly. So above, I would be irrational by not being motivated 
not to steal. Weaker still, we might think that it is necessary that normal or typical 
members of a community be so motivated to act. All of these views are versions of 
motivational internalism: that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment 
and motivation to action.12  
Nondescriptivists often argue that descriptivists have a hard time explaining 
motivational internalism. Descriptivism has it that to make a moral judgment is to 
accept a moral proposition. However, for any proposition that we might accept, there is 
another question of what to do about it, or more generally what normative significance 
to give it: "Even if that belief were settled, there would still be issues of what importance 
to give it, what to do, and all the rest. For we have no conception of a 'truth condition' or 
fact of which mere apprehension by itself determines practical issues. For any fact, there 
is a question of what to do about it." (Blackburn 1998: 70)  
Some think that this is the lesson to be learned from Moore's open question 
argument.13 For any putative descriptive definition of, say, 'goodness', there is always an 
open question whether the definiens really is good. According to nondescriptivism, this 
is just a reflection of the fundamentally different nature of descriptive judgment and 
moral judgment. Semantic nondescriptivism explains this straightforwardly: 
motivational internalism follows directly from semantic nondescriptivism. To claim that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
position on the grounds that nondescriptivism provides a thoroughly naturalistic explanation of moral 
practice that the quietist lacks. On the virtues of nondescriptive over quietist explanations generally, 
see Price (2015). 
12 See, for example, Darwall (1997) for a survey of the various forms of motivational internalism. 
13 e.g. Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992: 116-20). 
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stealing is wrong is to express a conative attitude towards stealing simply in virtue of 
the meaning of 'wrong'.14 
This line of argument is controversial for a number of reasons. First, it arguably begs 
the question against the descriptivist. On what non-question-begging grounds does the 
nondescriptivist claim that there is no fact the mere apprehension of which would 
determine practical issues? Second, it is perfectly open to the descriptivist to accept that 
desire-like motivational states necessarily play a role in moral judgment. The 
descriptivist only has to deny that the sentimental nature of moral judgment has any 
role to play in the semantics of moral language (or is constitutive of the moral judgment 
itself). Third, motivational internalism is itself a controversial thesis. The descriptivist 
might instead adopt an externalist position, according to which it is only a contingent 
fact that people who make moral judgments are motivated to act in certain ways. 
So arguments for nondescriptivism from the motivational aspect of morality are 
inconclusive. It is worth noting, however, that almost all parties to the debate do agree 
that the connection between moral judgment and motivation stands in need of some 
explanation, whatever this connection exactly is. Nondescriptivism provides possibly 
the most straightforward explanation of the practical role of moral discourse as 
nondescriptivism is fundamentally formulated in such terms. For example, semantic 
nondescriptivism (in the broader sense) involved specifying the directive attitude or 
mental state in providing the meaning of moral terms. This seems to be in contrast to 
descriptivism, which requires additional supplementary theory to explain how this 
particular area of descriptive discourse has such strong ties to motivation. 
There are other ways in which the nondescriptivist might argue against 
descriptivism.15 However I won't pursue such issues any further here. What I hope is 
clear from the discussion is the way in which nondescriptivism begins with a single 
thesis about language and then uses this to explain (or perhaps explain away) other 
puzzling aspects of moral discourse and practice. While a number of problems have 
been raised for semantic nondescriptivism, there is one very big problem in particular. 
This is the Frege-Geach problem, which will be the topic of the next section. 
 
1.2 Frege-Geach 
 
The Frege-Geach problem is not so much a single problem as a whole host of problems 
that arise for the semantics of nondescriptivism.16 Semantic nondescriptivism for 
                                                          
14 Nondescriptivists might also cite the Humean theory of motivation―that beliefs are motivationally 
inert and always require a desire like state―as defence of nondescriptivism. 
15 For example, one might also argue that the descriptivist has a hard time explaining how the moral 
supervenes on the natural―i.e., how there can be no moral difference with a natural difference. See, for 
example, Blackburn (1993b) and Horgan and Timmons (1992). 
16 Geach (1960, 1965). 
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language L is the thesis that the sentences of L do not have propositions as their 
contents.17,18 Compare: 
 
(1) 'Stealing is a crime' 
(2) 'Stealing is wrong' 
 
Let's assume that (1) is descriptive and (2) is nondescriptive. The meaning of (1) can be 
given in terms of the content that it expresses, namely the proposition that stealing is a 
crime, which provides the truth-conditions for (1).19 
As 'stealing' is a descriptive term, we can assume that it has the same semantic 
function in (2) as in (1). In (2) 'stealing' picks out the object of the noncognitive attitude 
that one has by accepting (2). (We'll see how this can be made more precise in the next 
chapter, but this simple formulation will suffice for present purposes.) Now, however, 
consider the following sentence: 
 
(3) 'If stealing is wrong, then tax avoidance is wrong' 
 
Here, (2) appears in an embedded or 'unasserted' context, viz., the antecedent of a 
conditional. Notice, however, that to accept a conditional, one need not accept its 
antecedent. For example, I do not need to believe that Elvis is alive to believe that if 
Elvis is alive, then he is keeping a lot of secrets. So in order to accept (3), I should not 
have to accept (1). This means that I can accept (3) without having any negative 
attitudes towards stealing.  
However, according to semantic nondescriptivism, to say that something is wrong is 
to express one's (say) condemnation towards it―this is because of what 'wrong' means. 
So by its very meaning, my acceptance of (3) should involve my having this attitude 
towards stealing. However, we have just seen that this is false. No such attitude is 
required to meaningfully use 'wrong' in (3). So if the meaning of 'wrong' in (2) is given 
in terms of the attitude one has in accepting (2), then 'wrong' cannot have the same 
meaning in (3). However, it clearly does have the same meaning. So semantic 
nondescriptivism provides an incorrect account of the meaning of wrong. 
                                                          
17 I use 'sentence' as shorthand for 'declarative sentence' throughout. 
18 I will treat 'meaning' and 'semantic value' as more or less synonymous, as with 'propositional 
meaning' and 'content'. Yalcin (2014) argues that a theory of semantic value should be sharply 
distinguished from a theory of content. I ignore this complication here. 
19 The semantic sense of 'expression' is not the same as the act-type sense of 'expression'. This 
terminology is in some ways unfortunate, as the sense of 'express' in the semantic nondescriptivists 
semantics is more plausibly the latter, whereas the sense in which a sentence expresses a proposition is 
clearly the former. See Bar-On and Chrisman (2009) for discussion of this issue.  
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Moreover, it is not simply a matter of providing some other kind of meaning for 
'wrong' in embedded contexts. For observe that anyone who accepts (2) and (3) seems 
also entitled to infer: 
 
(4) 'Tax avoidance is wrong' 
 
If 'wrong' were to have a different meaning in embedded contexts, the inference to (4) 
from (2) and (3) would commit the fallacy of equivocation. Both sentential and 
subsentential expressions are compositional in how they combine together with other 
expressions to make more complex ones. However, they retain a common content across 
all such contexts. The descriptivist, by positing propositions as the contents of sentences, 
faces no such problem, as propositional content remains stable and constant across 
contexts. The nondescriptivist, by contrast, fails to account for this. 
The Frege-Geach problem not only highlights a problem about meaning, but also 
about logic. The reason why we are entitled to the above inference is because it is 
logically valid: (roughly) the premises cannot be both true and yet the conclusion false. 
If we take these sentences to be descriptive, then the entailment and inconsistency 
relations between them can be explained in terms of the alethic properties of the 
propositions they express. No such explanation is available to the semantic 
nondescriptivist, however. Indeed, if the nondescriptivist allows this explanation in the 
descriptive case, then it is unclear how truth and valid reasoning are even meant to 
apply in the moral case. 
Of course, no one holds this sort of semantic nondescriptivism anymore, and much 
progress has been made developing sophisticated nondescriptive semantics that can 
answer these problems. I won't consider these here20, but it is worth noting the 
enormous undertaking that any such approach involves: 
  
In fact, and this cannot be emphasized enough, every natural-language construction that 
admits of descriptive predicates admits of moral predicates, and seems to function in 
precisely the same way: tense; conditionals; every kind of modal―alethic, epistemic, or 
deontic; qualifiers like 'yesterday'; generics and habituals; complement-taking verbs like 
'proved that' and 'wonders whether'; infinitive-taking verbs of every class, including 'expects 
to', 'wants to', and 'compels to'; binary quantifiers like 'many' and 'most'; and more. It is 
crucially important to understand that the embedding problem for noncognitivism is not 
simply a problem about the validity of modus ponens, or even simply about logic. Every 
construction in natural languages seems to work equally well no matter whether normative or 
descriptive language is involved, and to yield complex sentences with the same semantic 
properties. (Schroeder 2008b: 5) 
 
By appealing to propositions, however, we provide a straightforward and elegant 
account of how the sentences compositionally interact across a range of contexts while 
                                                          
20 See Schroeder (2008a) and the references therein for an overview. 
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retaining a stable content. Moreover, we also provide a straightforward and elegant 
account of the logic of the sentences in question. We might therefore hope for a 
nondescriptivism that is compatible with propositionalist approaches to semantics and 
logic. This is the subject of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Propositional Nondescriptivism? 
 
The proposal put forward in this thesis is that nondescriptivism and propositional or 
truth-conditional semantics are compatible. The basic thought is very simple. 
Propositions or propositional contents are posited in semantic theory to play a certain 
theoretical role. Particularly, they are the contents of sentences, the objects of 
propositional attitudes, and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. By postulating 
propositions in one's semantic theory of some domain, one can account for the 
compositional and logical properties of that domain of discourse. In and of itself, such 
an approach does not imply anything about the nature of propositions or propositional 
content. Therefore, there is no reason, at least in principle, why a suitably 
nondescriptive or nonrepresentational conception of propositions is not available to the 
nondescriptivist. If propositional content is not substantively representational, then a 
commitment to moral propositions need not imply a commitment to a metaphysically 
and epistemologically problematic domain of morality. 
The 'representationalist assumption' implicit in the standard set up of the debate 
between descriptivism and nondescriptivism is that propositions are essentially 
representational in some robust sense.21 This robustness might be thought to consist in 
an ontological commitment to moral properties that figure in states of affairs that 
correspond to true moral propositions via some metaphysically substantive, perhaps 
naturalistic, word-world relation. As natural as this assumption might be, it is not 
compulsory. Seeing that it is not compulsory creates the conceptual space required to 
develop a nondescriptivism that allows for moral propositions or propositional contents 
in its semantics. For want of a more attractive name, I will call such a position 
propositional nondescriptivism. 
At this level of abstraction, I don't think that there is much that can be said about 
exactly what propositional nondescriptivism consists in. As we shall see throughout our 
inquiry, there is no one single way in which to develop this thought. Clearly, however, 
there are at least two criteria of adequacy for any such theory. First, the account must be 
acceptably naturalistic. That is, it must explain our moral discourse and practice in a 
way that is consonant with our being natural creatures with natural capacities. Second, 
the account must be metaphysically and ontologically solvent. That is, it must explain 
moral discourse and practice in such a way as to sidestep the need for any metaphysics 
or epistemology of morality. It should go without saying too that one must also reject 
                                                          
21 c.f. Price (2013: 9). 
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semantic nondescriptivism, as this is clearly incompatible with propositional 
nondescriptivism.  
Given more orthodox theories about the nature of propositions, it is perhaps not 
surprising that this conceptual space has gone largely unnoticed. Consider a Fregean 
account, in which propositions are the senses of sentences, and senses are understood as 
modes of presentation that determine the reference of the sentence, where this is a state 
of affairs. The conception of reference here is clearly representational, as it commits one 
to the state of affairs presented by propositions. Or consider a Russellian view, in which 
the constituents of a proposition are the very worldly individuals that the proposition is 
about. On such a view, if a sentence has a proposition as its content, then it's hard to see 
how we could have anything but descriptivism for those sentences.  
If propositions are the primary bearers of truth and falsity, another reason for 
thinking that propositions are essentially representational is if one had some robustly 
representational conception of truth as some sort of substantive metaphysical relation 
between propositions and the world (Bar-On, Chrisman and Sias 2014: 235-6). 
Alternatively, if one takes possible worlds conceptions of propositions at face value, 
then propositions might naturally be associated with metaphysical commitment. For 
example, if one takes an ersatz view of possible worlds according to which possible 
worlds―maximally specific ways the world might be―simply are maximally consistent 
propositions (Schroeder 2013: 420). The present point is not that nondescriptivism is 
consistent with standard conceptions of truth and propositions. It is simply that one 
need not be committed to standard conceptions simply by using propositions in one's 
semantic theory.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into two main chapters. Chapter 2 examines 
respective attempts by Mark Schroeder and Michael Ridge to carry out this project 
within a broadly expressivist framework, where semantic content is derived from 
mental content. Both writers distinguish between propositions, which are not associated 
with metaphysical noncommitment, and representational contents, which are. Whereas 
both moral and descriptive belief are understood to involve propositions, only 
descriptive belief involves representational contents. Despite sharing this fundamental 
distinction, each view develops it in very different ways. I argue, however, that the 
distinction in neither case can be made to work. 
Chapter 3 examines a suggestion that propositional nondescriptivism might be best 
formulated as a thesis in metasemantics. The focus of the chapter will be Matthew 
Chrisman's propositional nondescriptivism, which argues for a semantics for 'ought' as 
a special kind of modal operator, which in turn is used to argue for a nondescriptivist 
metasemantics. In addition to its detailed development of a complementary semantics 
and metasemantics for moral language, Chrisman's account is also noteworthy for its 
inferentialist rather than expressivist formulation of nondescriptivism. It will be argued 
12 
 
that Chrisman's nondescriptivism is problematically incomplete. The chapter concludes 
with a tentative suggestion for a way forward.  
To lesser and greater extents, the writers examined here have broader theoretical and 
explanatory aims than those of the present inquiry. At times I have adapted certain 
aspects of the views in order to better suit the purposes of this thesis. I try to point out 
where I have done this. I don't think that I ever stray too far from any of the original 
views. However, if the authors themselves would not wish to own the change, the 
adapted views nonetheless provide interesting and fruitful materials, and of course owe 
themselves to their originals. 
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~ 2 ~ 
Expressivism and Representational Content 
 
 
This chapter focuses on a strategy for accommodating moral propositions within 
metaethical nondescriptivism within an expressivist framework. According to 
expressivism, the contents of sentences are accounted for in terms of the states of mind 
that we use them to express. Expressivists further hold that the states of mind expressed 
by moral claims are nonrepresentational or noncognitive. This is in contrast to 
descriptive sentences that are used to express representational beliefs. The distinction 
between the two kinds of mental state is standardly characterised in terms of 
propositions. Whereas representational beliefs have propositional content, moral beliefs 
do not. To reconcile expressivism and propositional approaches to moral content, we 
need some other way to distinguish descriptive and moral thought. The suggestion 
explored in this chapter is that the expressivist should distinguish between propositions 
and representational contents. Whereas the former are the objects of our attitudes and 
contents of our sentences, the latter play a representational role of marking 
metaphysical distinctions in reality. Nondescriptivism can then be understood as the 
claim that there are moral propositions but there are no moral representational contents. 
Descriptive thought is then distinguished from moral thought in terms of the relation 
that descriptive thought bears to representational contents. This chapter examines two 
attempts to provide a propositional nondescriptivism along these lines.  
 
2.1 Expressivism, Propositions, and Representational Contents 
 
In the sense under discussion in this chapter, the essence of expressivism can be 
summed up in the following slogan: "to explain the meaning of a term, explain what 
states of mind the term can be used to express." (Gibbard 2003: 7) This raises two 
questions. What about a term's meaning is being explained? What it is to express a state 
of mind? 
Perhaps surprisingly, expressivists and their opponents have not always been clear 
on what they take the answers to these questions to be.1 Probably the most prominent 
answer to these questions today is that expressivism provides a psychologistic 
compositional semantics for moral language, or natural language more generally. The 
                                                          
1 We will explore the variety of possible explanatory questions in some depth in the next chapter. 
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idea of a semantic theory for moral expressions is to assign contents (meanings, 
semantic values) to moral terms in such a way as to systematically explain the semantic 
contribution that moral terms make to the contents of the claims in which they figure. 
Orthodox approaches frame this in terms of the contribution that moral terms make to 
the truth-conditions of moral propositions. By contrast, expressivism frames this in 
terms of the contribution that moral terms make in determining what mental state is 
'expressed' by moral claims.2 The expression relation can then be cashed out in terms of 
assertability conditions for moral claims, where the conditions make reference to what 
mental state the speaker is conventionally in when uttering the claim. This is in contrast 
to a truth-conditional approach, where what is expressed by a claim is not a kind of 
mental state but a proposition.3 
 Importantly, expressivism takes mental content to be more fundamental than 
linguistic content. The contentfulness of sentences derives from the contentfulness of the 
states of mind they express. In order to know whether a claim is descriptive or 
nondescriptive, it must be known whether the mental state expressed by the claim is 
descriptive or nondescriptive. As a semantic program, expressivism does not imply 
nondescriptivism. For all that has been said, the mental states expressed by moral claims 
might be robustly representational beliefs. However, it is more or less universal in 
metaethics for expressivists to also be nondescriptivists about moral thought. As such, I 
will henceforth use 'expressivism' to mean nondescriptive expressivism, unless stated 
otherwise.  
In virtue of what is moral thought nondescriptive? In virtue of what are other kinds 
of thought descriptive? While expressivists have many positive things to say about the 
nature of moral thought, the sense in which it is nondescriptive is ultimately a negative 
claim―that it is not descriptive. Standardly, descriptive thought is explained in terms of 
propositions. For example, a descriptive belief is defined as an agent's bearing a 
particular relation to a corresponding descriptive proposition. The truth-conditions for 
descriptive claims are then derived from the corresponding proposition. On this picture, 
moral belief is nondescriptive in virtue of its not consisting in bearing this relation to a 
moral proposition. Rather, moral belief has some other nondescriptive functional role.  
While the positive story that the expressivist gives of the nondescriptive role of moral 
thought is vital in explaining moral thought, it should noted that the descriptivist need 
not disagree with this account. For the descriptivist will presumably agree that moral 
thought and discourse does indeed have a distinctive practical role in our lives. This is 
not inconsistent with a descriptivist conception of moral thought and discourse, though 
as we saw in the previous chapter, this might require some explanation. In any case, 
stating the distinctive functional role of moral thought is not alone sufficient to 
                                                          
2 This is explored in detail in Schroeder (2008b: ch.2). 
3 Plausibly, there are two distinct senses of 'expression' here―see Chapter 1 n.18. 
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distinguish descriptivism from nondescriptivism. Rather, the nondescriptivist needs to 
deny some positive claim that the descriptivist is committed to.  
If one wishes to advance a propositional nondescriptivism, then the above distinction 
between descriptivism and nondescriptivism will not do. How else might this 
distinction be drawn? Note that the main expressivist thought is that moral thought is 
distinctively different to descriptive thought qua attitude. It does not follow from this 
basis idea that the distinction must be given in terms of propositions or propositional 
content. Of course, if one already has a representational conception of propositions, this 
way of drawing the distinction seems obvious enough. However, there is nothing in the 
expressivist framework that forces this conception. So one might hope to find some 
other characteristic of descriptive thought that moral thought lacks. 
Here is a suggestion. Expressivists claim that moral thought is nondescriptive 
because descriptive thought consists in being appropriately related to an essentially 
representational entity. Suppose that propositions are not essentially representational. 
One might therefore posit some other kind of entity that is essentially representational 
that only descriptive thought is appropriately related to. Call such an entity a 
representational content. If both descriptive and nondescriptive thought are propositional, 
one might say that what makes descriptive thought descriptive is its being 
appropriately related to representational content; what makes moral thought 
nondescriptive is its not being appropriately related to representational content. This is 
because there are no moral representational contents, though there are moral 
propositions. 
Propositions play the role of being the objects of our attitudes, the contents of our 
sentences, and the bearers of truth and falsity. What sort of role do representational 
contents play? Nondescriptivism rejected moral propositions because of the supposed 
metaphysical import of (true) propositions for the moral domain. So we might say that 
representational contents are those entities that "serve to carve up the world," that 
"correspond to distinctions in reality," and that "are associated with metaphysical 
commitment of some kind" (Schroeder 2013: 418). While these representational-cum-
metaphysical roles are often associated with propositions, the expressivist might hope to 
pull them apart from the other roles played by propositions in order to make room for a 
nondescriptive conception propositions. 
This leaves open the question as to what kind of things propositions are, what kind 
of things representational contents are, and how the two are related. However, one 
might hope that by drawing this distinction, we open up the conceptual space required 
for a propositional nondescriptivism. The remainder of this chapter examines two 
expressivist theories that utilise this distinction. By 'expressivism', I just mean a 
commitment to explaining semantic content in terms of mental content, rather than the 
narrower sense of the term sketched above. As will be seen, the two views develop the 
basic thought in quite different ways. Both, however, will be rejected.  
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2.2 Schroeder on Propositions and Representational Contents 
 
The first view to be examined is due to Mark Schroeder (2013). Schroeder develops an 
expressivist view in which both moral and descriptive beliefs have moral and 
descriptive propositions as their respective contents, but only descriptive beliefs involve 
a representational content. The key move is to show exactly how moral and descriptive 
beliefs are structured. Schroeder suggests that whereas all beliefs consist in bearing a 
certain relation to a proposition, descriptive beliefs also involve bearing a relation to a 
representational content. If propositions and representational contents are distinct 
entities, the task for a propositional nondescriptivism is to explain how a single 
descriptive belief-state can consist in both a relation to a proposition and a distinct 
relation to a representational content. After providing a highly account of how moral 
and descriptive beliefs are structured, Schroeder then implements the general 
framework to provide a more fully worked out propositional nondescriptivism based 
on his (2008b) biforcated attitude semantics.  
 
2.2.1 Schroeder's Theory: Structured Beliefs and Being For 
 
As Schroeder sees it, the key to understanding how a nondescriptivist can allow for 
moral propositions is to understand the difference in structure between the mental states 
characteristic of moral thought and those characteristic of descriptive thought. It is 
orthodoxy to understand belief in terms of a particular relation that an agent bears to a 
proposition. For any agent A and any proposition P, A believes P just in case A bears the 
belief-relation to P. All beliefs necessarily exhibit the following structure: 
 
(1) A(P)   (2013: 422) 
 
All beliefs have this structure. If I believe that Meredith ought to seize the means of 
production, then I stand in the belief-relation to the proposition that Meredith ought to 
seize the means of production. Moral beliefs involve no representational content, and so the 
basic structure of moral belief is given simply by (1). 
The suggestion was that in descriptive cases, belief also consists in a relation to a 
distinct representational content in addition to a proposition. So the complexity of the 
structure of descriptive belief needs to be increased in order to accommodate this. 
Schroeder suggests the following. For any agent A, any descriptive proposition B(C) and 
any representational content C, descriptive beliefs necessarily exhibit the following 
structure: 
 
(2) A(B(C))  (2013: 422) 
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As B(C) denotes a proposition, all instances of (2) will be instances of (1). However, 
descriptive propositions are necessarily structured so as to contain a representational 
content as a propositional constituent. Furthermore, (2) can also be 'carved up' to get the 
relation A(B(_)), which is a relation an agent bears to a representational content.4 Thus, 
descriptive beliefs consist in two separate relations to two distinct (though related) 
entities. 
To get a firmer grip on how this last point works, Schroeder makes the following 
analogy. Suppose I am about to go on holiday to Paris. We might say that I am in the 
state of being about to go to Paris. What does being in this state consist in? On the one 
hand, it involves me being appropriately related to the city Paris, where the relation is 
something like being about to go to x. However, it also involves me being appropriately 
related to the act-type of going to Paris, where the relation is something like being about 
to φ. Schroeder make the following observation: 
 
Since the relational action of going to is part of both the action of going to Paris, and of the 
relation of being about to go to, and since Paris figures in the action of going to Paris, there is no 
puzzle about how the state of being about to go to Paris can be carved up in each of these 
distinct ways. (2013: 421) 
 
This highlights how the state of being about to go to Paris is not simply a conjunction of 
two distinct states that I happen to be in. Rather, it consists in these two states. How one 
decides to analyse the complex state depends on one's theoretical interests.  
In an analogous way, descriptive belief states can be analysed into an agent bearing 
two distinct relations to two distinct entities. First, it consists in one's bearing a certain 
relation to a descriptive proposition, which necessarily contains a representational 
content as a constituent. But it also consists in one's bearing a different relation to the 
representational content. Having a moral belief, by contrast, consists only in one's 
bearing a relation to a proposition. To lend support to the view, Schroeder notes that, if 
true, it would explain why a distinction between propositions and representational 
contents is so easy to overlook (2013: 422). Many paradigm cases of belief are descriptive 
beliefs that involve both a proposition and representational content, this fact only 
revealed theoretical analysis. As such, it would be natural to conflate the two. 
At such an abstract level, it is hard to assess this general framework. Indeed, it is 
hard to see exactly what a more concrete example would look like. For example, no clue 
                                                          
4 It's actually unclear exactly how the relations are represented on this picture. While Schroeder 
expressly states that 'A(_)' and 'A(B(_))' denote relations, strictly speaking, the relations are actually 
denoted by '_(_)' and '_(_(_))'. Given that the structure of descriptive propositions is B(C), this seems to 
commit Schroeder to the claim that propositions necessarily involve some binary relation. Confusingly, 
Schroeder goes on to talk about the relation denoted by 'B'. This is confusing as the other relations are 
given by brackets, not letters. We will see below that this creates problems for Schroeder and is not 
merely a matter of presentation. 
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has been given to what sort of thing 'B' designates.5 (We will return to this in the next 
section.) Furthermore, there is nothing about the framework itself that is inherently 
nondescriptivist. True, we have a stipulated distinction between propositions and 
representational contents. However, nothing at all has been said about what kind of 
thing either of these things are. Even accepting that there is a distinction, propositions 
might still turn out to be unacceptably representational for the nondescriptivist. I submit 
that the only way of answering these questions is by looking to the implementation of 
the general framework, to which we now turn.  
 
Schroeder develops a variant of his biforcated attitude semantics (BAS), developed in 
his (2008b), as an instance of the general framework outlined above. The original 
semantics were developed as an expressivist alternative to truth-conditional semantics 
for natural langauge. On the present picture, it aims to accommodate moral 
propositions rather than reject them. As such, the variant semantics are not really an 
alternative to truth-conditional semantics. Rather, it might be instead seen as an 
alternative picture to the standard view of what truth-conditional semantics is about. 
Indeed, Schroeder takes "the primary lesson" of his variant account to be "that the 
differences between descriptivist and nondescriptivist semantics can be fruitfully 
thought of not as a dispute between very different ways of doing semantic theory (one 
with propositions and one without), but rather as a dispute about what 
propositions―the objects of the attitudes and bearers of truth and falsity―are like." 
(2013: 424) The account presented here is a somewhat simplified version of Schroeder's 
own account. As well as for readability, this is because there are a number of technical 
details that are irrelevant for present purposes. Nothing should hang on this. 
Schroeder's BAS was originally developed in an attempt to provide a formally 
adequate solution to the Frege-Geach problem. It takes as its starting point the problem 
as it arises for negation, but the solution is fully general.6 What is important for present 
purposes is Schroeder's diagnosis of the problem. As he sees it, the problem arises due 
to the lack of structure in the attitudes that moral sentences are purported to express. 
This is in contrast to the attitudes expressed by descriptive sentences. Consider: 
 
(3) 'Snow is white' 
 
The presence of the descriptive predicate 'is white' indicates that the speaker of (1) 
expresses a descriptive kind of mental state, namely belief. Further, the predicate also 
corresponds to a certain content of the belief, namely the propositional constituent is 
white. Moreover, any descriptive predicate used assertorically will indicate both (i) a 
                                                          
5 See n.4 above.  
6 For the Frege-Geach problem as it arises for negation, see Unwin (1999, 2001). 
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uniform attitude (belief) and (ii) some particular descriptive content that figures in the 
overall content of the attitude.  
Now consider: 
 
(4) 'Stealing is wrong' 
 
Standardly, expressivists claim the moral predicate 'is wrong' indicates a certain 
attitude, say disapproval, that the speaker has towards stealing. Unlike descriptive 
predicates, there is no particular kind of moral content that moral predicates pick out 
that appears in the overall content of the attitude. Whereas descriptive predicates 
indicate a general structured attitude, moral predicates indicate particular unstructured 
attitudes. 
Schroeder argues that it is precisely this lack of structure in the kind of mental states 
expressed by moral claims that gives rise to the Frege-Geach problem. After all, we 
would not say that the descriptive predicate 'is white' in (3) indicates an unstructured 
attitude, believes-white, that the speaker has towards snow (2008b: 56-7). But this is 
precisely what expressivism says about moral predicates. The solution, therefore, is to 
posit some basic and general structured noncognitive attitude that moral sentences 
express. On this picture, moral predicates contribute to the content of the general 
attitude and not just indicate that attitude (which they do also). Schroeder suggests we 
call this attitude being for.7  
Being for is a practical attitude that agents bear towards properties. The relevant kind 
of properties are things that we can do, actions (broadly construed) that can be 
expressed in English using gerunds. The idea is that for every predicate, there is a 
corresponding property of the relevant sort that an agent who assertorically uses that 
predicate 'is for'. As what the agent is for is something the agent can do, we can think of 
the properties involved as those things that an agent is disposed to do when in the 
mental state expressed by the use of the corresponding property.  
So suppose that moral discourse is constitutively bound up with the practice of 
blaming. This is of course over-simplistic, but supposing it were right, we might then 
say something like the following. The moral predicate 'is wrong' corresponds to the 
property blaming for; the speaker of (4) expresses the mental state of being for blaming for 
stealing. More generally, for any predicate F, there is a corresponding relation RF such 
that 'x is F' expresses the mental state of being for bearing RF to x; that is, F(a) expresses 
FOR(bearing RF to a) (2008b: 58).8 As with belief, we now have a uniform structured 
                                                          
7 Hence biforcated attitude semantics. 
8 More precisely, the properties are given in terms of lambda-abstractions rather than gerunds, so for 
any predicate 'F(x1,...xn)', there is a corresponding relation denoted by RF(z,x1,...xn) so that if 'a1,...an' are 
singular terms denoting o1,...on, then F(a1,...an) expresses FOR(z(RF(z,o1,...on))), where 'z' might naturally 
understood to denote an agent (2008b: 78).  
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attitude type that is expressed by all moral predicates. Moreover, each moral predicate 
will correspond to some content, where this is the kind of property given above.9  
Note, also, that the content of the attitude in question corresponds to a natural 
property, which is picked out by a descriptive term (e.g. blaming). So the account avoids 
any metaphysical commitment to moral properties. Counter-intuitively, the content of 
moral thought on this picture is a sort of descriptive content. This is not to say that we 
have reduced moral terms to descriptive content in any way, however. While moral 
terms contribute to the content of the thought that they express, they are not referential, 
and so do not refer to these contents. As we saw above, they express a structured 
attitude. The nondescriptive nature of moral thought is then captured by the practical 
attitude of being for―moral thought "is tied to action, in the broadest possible sense. 
When you are for something... that is what you do." (2008b: 84) In other words, the 
functional role of a state of being for is to lead the agent to acquire the property that the 
state is 'for'.  
Schroeder then goes on to show how an account along these lines can explain the 
compositionality and logic of moral thought up to the complexity of predicate logic. The 
logical relations between moral sentences are explained (inter alia) in terms of the 
inconsistency relations between the contents of the thoughts involved. As the contents 
of moral thoughts are descriptive, all that is needed is for gerunds to be governed by the 
relevant logical properties (2008b: 68). Intuitively, this seems to be so. For example, 
kissing and telling entails kissing and entails telling, stealing and not stealing are 
inconsistent, and so on.10 In the next section we will see there is reason to doubt this, but 
let's assume that it's right for now. 
BAS was first motivated by contrasting being for to belief. But the contrast now gives 
rise to a problem. This is the problem of mixed sentences, which include both moral and 
descriptive predicates. It is unclear what sort of state the expressivist will say that this 
expresses―is it belief or being for? Moreover, given that belief and being for have quite 
different contents (properties and propositions), it is unclear how one state could have 
both kinds of content. 
The solution is to analyse one attitude in terms of the other so that both moral and 
descriptive sentences express a single type of mental state. Schroeder thinks that to 
analyse being for in terms of belief is just to abandon nondescriptivism, and so the 
expressivist must analyse belief in terms of being for. As being for takes properties as its 
                                                          
9 'Correspond' not in any referential or representational sense, but in the sense that the use of any such 
predicate expresses a mental state with the corresponding content. Schroeder uses the terminology 
'semantic value' to denote this relation.  
10 Once quantification and lambda-abstraction have been introduced, Schroeder provides a more 
rigorous treatment of the logic of the properties that being for takes as its objects (2008b: 80-2). There 
are also complications that arise due to the possibility or otherwise of moral dilemmas (2008b: 71-4). I 
ignore these issues here. 
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object, what is needed is a general kind of property that is distinctively involved in 
descriptive belief. To this end, Schroeder introduces the notion of proceeding-as-if:  
 
I say that believing that p is being for proceeding as if p. What we need, of course, in order to 
analyze believing that p as being for something, is some relation to p, so that we can construct 
a property out of p that is something that the believer can be for. This property is something 
that the believer does with respect to p, or at least is for doing with respect to p, when she 
believes that p. And so I call this relation proceeding as if. On my best gloss, to proceed as if p is 
to take p as settled in deciding what to do. So being for proceeding as if p is being for taking p 
as settled in deciding what to do. Assuming that being for has the motivational property that 
someone who is for α will tend to do α, other things being equal, it follows that someone who 
believes that p will tend to proceed as if p, other things equal. That is, she will tend to treat p 
as settled in deciding what to do. (2008b: 93-4) 
 
So the claim 'grass is green' expresses the attitude of being for proceeding-as-if grass is 
green. While Schroeder is not entirely confident with this analysis of belief, in order to 
give it some plausibility, he notes that it is what believers in fact do, "so this is not, after 
all, a crazy thing to say about belief." (2008b: 94) 
Here ends the simplified sketch of Schroeder biforcated attitude semantics.11 In the 
original account, moral sentences are nonpropositional, as they express mental states 
that are nonpropositional. Despite the fact that descriptive sentences also express states 
of being for, they remain propositional, as the states of being for take properties that 
involve propositions―'proceeding-as-if' takes propositions in its complement position. 
The account therefore must be adapted in some way if we are to accommodate moral 
propositions. 
Propositions are the objects of our attitudes. If moral and descriptive belief consists in 
states of being for, then the possible objects of our attitudes are given by the class of 
properties that being for can take as its object. So why not simply identify propositions 
with these objects? Propositions can then be individuated in the following way: 
 
to think about what properties are involved in the proposition that grass is green, that murder 
is wrong, that Max is in Albequerque, or that if she says yes, we'll be engaged, we have to 
think about what someone who believes that grass is green, that murder is wrong, that Max is 
in Albequerque, or that if she says yes, we'll be engaged, is motivated to do, other things 
being equal. (2013: 425) 
 
                                                          
11 It turns out that a new negation problem can be created for descriptive belief on this proposal. To 
solve it, states of being for have to take pairs of properties as their objects (hence biforcated attitude 
semantics), where these are entailing properties with a major property at least strong as the minor. So 
the descriptive belief that p = <FOR(pai p)*, FOR(¬pai ¬p)>, where * denotes the major attitude (2008b: 
99). 
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As the properties in question are descriptive, they will plausibly have the right kind of 
compositional and logical properties distinctive of propositions (though, again, see 
below). 
Moreover, note that the propositions for any domain of discourse will be able to 
explain in part what is distinctive about that domain. This was seen with the example of 
morality and blaming above. This is a welcome aspect, as it is common to think that 
what is distinctive about a domain of discourse is explained by what that discourse is 
about, i.e., in terms of the propositions of that domain. However, this thought has now 
been given a nondescriptivist twist. For 'what the discourse is about' is not explained 
referentially in terms of a basic representational attitude (belief), but rather in terms of 
the distinctive properties that the practical attitude of being for takes as its objects for 
domain in question. 
Importantly, this still leaves room for descriptivism. Any descriptive belief will 
consist partly in a relation to an essentially representational entity, viz., a 
representational content. Schroeder leaves the question of what a representational 
content might be open. However, he suggests that many of the traditional conceptions 
of propositions might be suitable to play this role. For example, representational 
contents might be understood to be sets of metaphysically possible worlds, or as 
structured Russellian propositions (2013: 426n). 
 
2.2.2 Some Problems For Schroeder 
 
One of the key notions introduced in BAS that was that of proceeding-as-if. This notion, 
together with that of representational content, was vital for differentiating descriptive 
beliefs and propositions from other kinds of beliefs and propositions. In the presentation 
of the general framework, these two notions correspond to 'B' and 'C' respectively. Thus, 
proceeding-as-if is not an inessential detail, but essential in differentiating descriptivism 
and nondescriptivism under BAS. However, the notion gives rise to a number of 
difficulties that stem from how the notion interacts with representational contents in 
order to comprise descriptive propositions. So the problems lie at the very foundation of 
Schroeder's approach to propositional nondescriptivism. 
The main problem with using proceeding-as-if in order to pick out the class of 
descriptive beliefs is that the notion seems to apply just as much in the moral case as it 
does in the descriptive. It was seen above that whatever we think of proceeding-as-if as 
an analysis of belief, it does look like a plausible description of what believers do. For 
example, if I believe that there is gin in the fridge, then it seems true to say that I am for 
proceeding-as-if there is gin in the fridge. This roughly means that I take this as settled 
in deciding what to do. So if when deciding whether to have a drink, I take it as settled 
that there is gin in the fridge; when deciding whether I need to buy any drinks, I take it 
as settled that there is gin in the fridge; and so on. 
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Suppose now that I believe that drinking alcohol is morally wrong. Is it not true to 
say that I am for proceeding-as-if drinking alcohol is morally wrong? It certainly seems 
like something that I can take this as settled in my decision making. For example, if I am 
deciding whether to do something wrong, then I will take it as settled that drinking 
alcohol is wrong. Moral beliefs and descriptive beliefs share a common functional role in 
connection with how beliefs and desires can combine to create intentions. For example, 
my belief that the gin is in the fridge together with my desire to have a drink may result 
in my forming an intention to drink a glass of gin. The previous example shows that this 
is also true of moral beliefs; indeed, Schroeder himself makes this point (2013: 414). 
However, proceeding-as-if was meant to be the property distinctive of descriptive 
belief―definitionally so, in fact. As it plausibly applies to all kinds of belief and not just 
a particular class of beliefs, either moral belief must be descriptive, or we have failed to 
pick out what is distinctive of descriptive belief.  
In his original BAS, Schroeder acknowledges that the locution 'being for proceeding-
as-if' can be used to truly describe to all kinds of belief, not just descriptive. To maintain 
the descriptive/nondescriptive distinction, he makes the following suggestion: 
 
[So] anyone could pick and choose which sentences, 'P', [i] qualify as ordinary descriptive 
sentences, on the grounds that it is possible to understand what it would be for it to be the 
case that P, and [ii] which require instead an analysis of what it would be to proceed as if P... 
On this picture, the basic expressivist idea is an idea about what it is to proceed as if murder is 
wrong. (2008b: 156 emphasis added) 
 
So the idea is that whether a claim is descriptive or nondescriptive depends on what 
'proceeding-as-if p' consists in for the claim in question. Thus one might maintain that 
while it is true that believing that murder is wrong is being for proceeding-as-if murder 
is wrong, "[t]o proceed as if murder is wrong... just is to blame for murder." (2008b: 155) 
Rather than coming to rescue the amended BAS, however, this response further 
confounds it. In the earlier account, moral discourse is still being understood as 
nonpropositional. So where Schroeder claims that an analysis of descriptive belief 
consisted in understanding "what it would be for it to be the case that P", this 
presumably means to apprehend a proposition, where this only applies in the 
descriptive case. But this cannot be used to draw the distinction between descriptive 
and nondescriptive belief on the adapted account, as we are allowing for nondescriptive 
propositions. What this shows is that it is highly intuitive to treat proceeding-as-if as 
taking propositions for its object. Indeed, this is what the original account of proceeding-
as-if seems to maintain. However, this cannot be the case in the adapted account, as it 
applies just as much in the moral case as it does in the descriptive case. And this just 
means that we have failed to pick out any distinctive characteristic of descriptive belief 
that distinguishes it from nondescriptive belief. 
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Furthermore, if it did take propositions for its object, this would actually result in 
there being two distinct belief states in descriptive cases where intuitively there is only 
one. For any state of being for proceeding-as-if p, 'p' would be ambiguous between the 
proposition and the representational content that figures in that proposition. As it is part 
of our hypothesis that these are distinct, there would therefore two distinct beliefs 
corresponding to any descriptive claim. 
Perhaps one might make the following reply. In the everyday sense of the notion, 
'proceeding-as-if' does apply to all beliefs, and does take propositions as its object. 
However, 'proceeding-as-if' is here being introduced as a piece of theoretical 
terminology to pick out whatever property is distinctive of descriptive belief. Therefore, 
it is irrelevant that there is a sense that applies to moral beliefs, for this is not the sense 
in question. Moreover, let it be defined by stipulation that this property takes only 
representational contents as object. So while the exact nature of this property is yet to be 
specified, nothing has been said to rule out there being such a property that is 
distinctive of descriptive belief in the right sort of way. 
There is no inconsistency in maintaining such an account. The problem, however, is 
that we have been given no reason to think that any distinctive property actually exists. 
A fortiori, we have no reason to accept that there is any real distinction to be drawn 
along these lines between descriptive and nondescriptive belief. Any recognisable sense 
of 'proceeding-as-if' applies just as much to moral belief as it does to descriptive belief, 
and it cannot simply be assumed that there is some sense that does mark a real 
distinction. Thus, the account fails to provide the resources to maintain the distinction 
between descriptive and nondescriptive beliefs other than by (unmotivated) fiat. 
 
Does the foregoing discussion tell us anything about the prospects of the general 
framework itself? As already mentioned, I think that it is far too abstract to draw any 
strong conclusions one way or the other concerning its plausibility. However, the onus 
is surely the proponent of such an approach to show that it is viable. It cannot simply be 
assumed that there is a real distinction between descriptive and nondescriptive beliefs 
in the form of (1) and (2). The adapted BAS in the end failed not simply because it 
contained false or implausible assumptions (though this may also be the case), but 
because it failed to properly distinguish between descriptive and nondescriptive beliefs. 
So in the end, the account failed not just because it was false, but because it was not a 
genuine instance of the general framework. At least, except by implausible stipulation. 
One might take the nature of this failure as grounds for pessimism that the approach 
can ultimately be made to work. 
What the failure came down to was providing an adequate account of what takes the 
place of B in (2), the analysis of the structure of descriptive belief. From the general 
account alone, it is not at all obvious what sort of thing this could be. (Although in the 
end it fails, it does seem to fit BAS rather nicely; one suspects that, despite express 
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statements to the contrary, the framework was advanced with BAS in mind.) 
Notwithstanding the above objection, however, we see that there are very strong 
constraints as to the kind of entity that could be descriptive propositions on this picture.  
First, notice the constraints that are given by (2) itself. It has already been seen how it 
is unclear what kind of thing is meant to be denoted by 'B'. Further, consider the 
constraints imposed by any account of propositions. Particularly, propositions must 
have the right logical and compositional structure. It was seen that Schroeder captures 
this by the logic of gerunds. In the descriptive case, this requires the assumption that 
proceeding-as-if p and proceeding-as-if not-p are inconsistent. This is a plausible 
assumption, but it is worth highlighting that it is an assumption nonetheless, as even 
this fundamental feature of the account might be challenged. Moreover, the constraints 
are stronger than simply this, as we need to guarantee not just any inconsistency, but 
logical inconsistency for conflicting beliefs with contradictory pai-propositions. 
Further, it turns out that the kinds of properties posited as propositions by BAS do 
not have the right logical properties in many contexts more complex than predicate 
logic, such as embedding under tense and modal operators (2008b: 169-72). Recall that 
the state of being for motivated one to have the property one is for. If we understand 
tense-operators to operate on propositions, they will operate likewise on the relevant 
properties. However, this would implausibly result in being motivated to, say, have a 
property in the past. The general point is that propositions have logical and 
compositional properties across a wide-range of cases, and any account of propositions 
will need to meet these constraints. 
Traditional accounts of propositions are structured exactly to have these properties. 
Schroeder's account, however, begins with another kind of constraint―the structure 
given in (2)―and then proceeds to accommodate the other properties of propositions 
from thereon. The only attempt, BAS, manifestly fails in this respect. It seems that the 
logical and compositional properties of propositions are the sorts of features that we 
should be concerned to accommodate from the outset, not downstream from a more 
fundamental concern, such as introducing the requisite structure of descriptive and 
nondescriptive mental states. 
I see no reason to rule out the actualisation of an adequate theory based on 
Schroeder's general framework. However, the aforementioned constraints do pose a 
serious obstacle to any such theory, and little reason has been given to think that the 
approach can ultimately be made to succeed. Given that there are other candidate 
approaches to developing a propositional nondescriptivism other than Schroeder's, I 
submit that time will be better spent examining these other approaches, rather than 
puzzling over what possible sort of entity could play the required role of descriptive 
propositions in Schroeder's framework.  
In the remainder of this chapter, another expressivist approach that distinguishes 
propositions and representational contents will be examined. This approach advances 
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both a different conception of what propositions are, as well as a rather account of how 
descriptive beliefs (and, as we shall see, nondescriptive beliefs) are related to 
representational contents. However, I will argue that this approach likewise fails to 
adequately maintain the required distinction between the descriptive and the 
nondescriptive case.  
 
2.3 Ridge's Ecumenical Expressivism 
 
Michael Ridge's Ecumenical Expressivism is a 'hybrid' theory of moral thought and 
language that combines elements of descriptivism and nondescriptivism. The theory is 
nondescriptivist in that the contents of moral sentences and beliefs are not 
representational contents. More particularly, it is an expressivist theory that explains the 
contents of moral claims in terms of the mental states expressed by such claims. What 
makes the view hybrid is the claim that the mental states expressed by moral claims are 
relational states, that have both a descriptive and nondescriptive component. In 
particular, the state consists in a representational belief being appropriately related to a 
nonrepresentational 'normative perspective'. (It is also possible for hybrid theories to be 
descriptivist, and so it remains to be seen in exactly what sense Ecumenical 
Expressivism is a version of nondescriptivism.) 
As with Schroeder, Ridge hopes to provide a nondescriptivist account of moral 
propositions. Rather than beginning with a nondescriptivist conception of propositions 
and building the account from there, Ridge begins with a general account of moral 
discourse and incorporates moral propositions into that account. So while our main 
concern here is to examine and assess Ridge's account of moral propositions, it will be 
necessary to first provide a brief outline of the theory as a whole. Also like Schroeder, 
Ridge aims to accommodate moral propositions by distinguishing between propositions 
and representational contents. However, as moral beliefs are hybrid and so always 
involve a descriptive belief component, it follows that moral beliefs always involve a 
representational content. Whether a belief is descriptive or not depends on the way in 
which the representational content interacts with the belief. Summarily put, if the 
content of the belief just is a representational content, then it is descriptive; if it is not, it 
is nondescriptive.  
While Ridge manages to avoid some of the problems that Schroeder's approach 
encountered, it will ultimately be rejected. Similarly to Schroeder, however, Ridge's 
account of moral propositions fails to utilise the distinction between propositions and 
representational contents to adequately distinguish between descriptive and 
nondescriptive thought. Unlike Schroeder, the problems for Ridge arise from the 
nondescriptive rather than the descriptive case. 
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2.3.1 Ecumenical Expressivism and Moral Propositions 
 
Before outlining Ecumenical Expressivism, it should be noted that the version presented 
here is actually a variant on Ridge's own account. Ridge argues that the central 
nondescriptivist thesis should not be a semantic thesis about the contents of moral 
claims or thoughts, but rather a metasemantic thesis that explains why moral claims and 
thoughts have the contents that they do. The presentation here, however, will forego 
formulating the theory in metasemantic terms. While this might seem like an 
unjustifiably large change to make, I believe that there is good reason for doing so.  
First, the distinction does far less work in Ridge's theory than it might initially seem. 
Indeed, once the commitments of the theses are worked out in more detail, the 
formulations of the main claims of Ecumenical Expressivism put forward by Ridge and 
the variants put forward below differ little in substance.12 Second, perhaps more 
importantly, there a number of issues that arise from Ridge's metasemantic formulation 
that can easily be avoided if formulated in more standard terms. Moreover, the issues 
that arise have nothing much to do with Ecumenical Expressivism, but with placing 
metaethics at the metasemantic level in general. These issues will be explored in depth 
in the next chapter. While the discussion there will not focus on Ecumenical 
Expressivism, the same arguments apply mutatis mutandis.13 So it is both possible and 
desirable to avoid these problems in our discussion of Ecumenical Expressivism. For 
readability, however, I will refer to the presented account as if it is Ridge's own 
presentation. 
With these caveats in place, we can now turn to the theory itself. Ecumenical 
Expressivism aims to account for not just morality, but practical normativity more 
generally. Vaguely stated, practical normative judgment aims to settle "the thing to do" 
and the "thing to intend", and normative claims (or better: assertoric utterances of moral 
normative sentences) express these judgments (2014: 19).14 There are a number of 
predicates that are distinctive of practical normativity, such as evaluatives ('good', 'bad'), 
directives ('ought', 'must'), and reason claims ('x is a reason to φ'). To provide a unified 
and fully general account of normative thought and discourse, Ridge suggests that all 
normative claims can be analysed into an equivalent claim about where the action 
stands on any acceptable standard of practical reasoning (2014: 40). A standard is 
broadly speaking a rule or policy which can be used as the basis of judgment or 
decision; 'acceptable' is a primitive normative term.  
                                                          
12 For reasons of space, I cannot show that this is the case here. I simply ask for the reader's trust on this 
matter. 
13 Some worries about this distinction that are more specific to Ridge's account can be found in Alwood 
(2016). 
14 'Judgment' here is being used as a theoretically neutral term to describe whatever mental state is 
expressed by normative claims.  
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For example, the moral predicate 'good' can be analysed in terms of being ranked 
highly by any acceptable moral standard. So to claim that 'Giving to charity is (morally) 
good' is to claim that giving to charity is highly ranked by any acceptable moral 
standard. While this is provides a general analysis of moral claims, it is important to 
emphasise that the analysans is still itself within the normative domain. This is because 
it employs the normative notion of an acceptable moral standard. The idea at this stage is 
simply to provide a unified account that 'locates' normative thought and discourse. It is  
not to provide a nonnormative reductive analysis.15 
The standards-based account of morality is silent on whether moral discourse is 
descriptive or nondescriptive. As an expressivist theory, Ecumenical Expressivism 
proceeds to ask what kind of mental state is expressed by the conventional use of moral 
sentences. Its answer is that moral sentences express moral judgments. Moral judgments 
are relational states consisting of (i) a (noncognitive) normative perspective, and (ii) a 
representational belief. Further, (i) and (ii) must be connected in the right way.  
All moral claims can be paraphrased into claims about acceptable moral standards. 
Standards are understood as rules or principles used as a basis for judgment. As agents, 
we have a basic nondescriptive attitude of accepting rules or principles, where this is to 
be disposed to issue the relevant prescriptions (2014: 111). Moreover, being treated by an 
agent as a standard is more basic than being a standard of reasoning (2014: 40). A 
normative perspective is "a set of relatively stable self-governing policies about which 
standards to reject and accept." (2014: 115) So to adopt a particular normative 
perspective is to take a particular practical stance with respect to decision making. 
Moreover, the relevant standards are understood as 'ultimate', which means they are not 
based on any more fundamental standards and provide a complete guide to action 
(2014: 116-17). As normative perspectives are understood maximally relative to an agent 
at a particular time, we can understand an agent's moral perspective as the subset of 
their normative perspective, viz., the subset concerning distinctively moral concerns. 
This accounts for the noncognitive component of moral judgment.16 
The cognitive component consists in a descriptive or representational belief, the 
contents of which are related in a particular way to the agent's normative perspective. 
Ridge provides the following example (2014: 119). Consider the following claim: 
                                                          
15 The standard-based context-sensitive analysis is presented first as a semantics for moral claims. 
Expressivism is then understood as a metasemantic thesis about what grounds the semantics. 
However, insofar as the analysis aims to provide a fully general and unified account that locates the 
practically normative, we need not be too concerned about the exact nature of the analysis, as in any 
case, the paraphrase will still hold whatever account we give. The important point is that the analysans 
is itself normative. It is instructive to compare this to Schroeder (2007) who suggests that a reduction of 
the normative should consist in two stages: first, a reduction of all normative notions to a fundamental 
normative notion (for Schroeder, reason claims; for Ridge, acceptable-standards claims); second, a 
reduction of the fundamental normative notion to a nonnormative notion.  
16 On norm-acceptance and plan-acceptance as noncognitive, see Gibbard (1990, 2003). 
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(5) 'X is good as an end' 
 
This can be analysed into the following equivalent claim: 
 
(6) 'X would be highly ranked as an end by any acceptable ultimate standard of 
practical reasoning' 
 
This judgment is analysed as a hybrid state constituted by the following pair: 
 
(6N) A normative perspective. 
(6R) The belief that X would be ranked highly as an end by any admissible ultimate 
standard of practical reasoning. 
 
These two states are connected in virtue of 'any admissible ultimate standard' being 
indexed to the agent's normative perspective. So the standards referred to in (6R) are 
those standards not ruled out by the agent's normative perspective. It follows that 
normative judgments can be multiply-realised, as there need be no uniquely fixed 
content of the representational belief involved in the judgment (at least in abstraction 
from any particular normative perspective). Furthermore, an agent must necessarily 
have (6N) and (6R) in order to be in the mental state expressed by (6), as it is constitutive 
of moral judgment to be a relational state in this way. 
Given the descriptive component of moral judgment, one might naturally raise the 
following question: in what sense is Ecumenical Expressivism a form of 
nondescriptivism? The difference between descriptivism and nondescriptivism can be 
stated as a difference in how the content of a moral claim is related to the content of the 
representational belief component of moral judgment. It was noted above that there are 
also descriptivist hybrid theories, and it is helpful to first examine what would make a 
hybrid view descriptivist. Ridge makes the following suggestion. A hybrid view is 
descriptivist just in case the content of the claim 'p' is identical to the content of the 
representational belief component of the relational state expressed by 'p' (2014: 80). So it 
might still be the case that moral judgments necessarily involve a noncognitive attitude, 
or even constitutively involve a noncognitive component.  
What is required for descriptivism is that the content of the claim expressing a moral 
judgment is for its content to be identical to the representational content of the 
descriptive belief component of the judgment. For this would have the consequence of 
being committed to moral representational contents. And if we associate 
representational contents with metaphysical commitment, then this draws the line 
between descriptive and nondescriptive belief just where it should do. 
As Ecumenical Expressivism does not meet this requirement, it is not a form of 
descriptivism. Consider claim (6). One way in which we can gloss the content of the 
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claim is in a deflationary manner. Here, we can talk about the truth-conditional content 
of (6), as speakers will be able to grasp the truth-conditions of (6) in the minimal sense 
that they can grasp the relevant platitudes. Grasping the relevant platitudes, however, 
does not amount to knowledge of the descriptive conditions under which the claim is 
true, i.e., grasping a representational content. The analysis of moral claims yielded a 
normative analysans. So while the representational belief is a necessary component of 
the mental state expressed by (6), the content of (6) is not identified with the descriptive 
content of (6R). Rather, (6) has an irreducibly moral content.  
So while the primitive normative notion of an 'acceptable standard' might indicate 
the presence of a descriptive belief involving the (representational) content of an 
admissible standard, acceptability does not in any way reduce to admissibility. Rather, 
what one takes to be acceptable is determined by one's normative perspective; 
admissibility then refers to the standards deemed acceptable by the agent (hence is 
representational). Moreover, because 'acceptable' is explained nonreferentially, the 
theory avoids all of the problems associated with descriptivism about moral terms 
outlined in the previous chapter. In other words, Ecumenical Expressivism does not 
commit us to there being any moral representational contents. So how can we 
understand moral propositions? 
 
Here, Ridge appeals to Scott Soames' theory of propositions as cognitive event types. 
The theory is largely motivated by a number of problems that arise for traditional 
theories of propositions. We need not dwell on such issues here. What is important is 
the contrast in explanatory priority between traditional theories and Soames' alternative. 
Consider that, on the one hand, we describe propositions as representing the world as 
being a certain way. However, we also describe agents as representing the world as 
being a certain way, such as when we judge that p. These two ideas seem intimately 
connected. The question is whether our cognitions are representational in virtue of their 
bearing a relation to propositions, or whether propositions are representational in virtue 
of our representational activities.  
Traditional approaches maintain that the representational nature of propositions is 
explanatorily prior. On this picture, propositions are somehow intrinsically 
representational. When an agent represents things as thus or so in thought or language, 
its representationality is derived from the proposition or propositions that the thought 
or sentence is related to. Soames argues that this commitment is the source of many of 
the traditional problems that arise for theories of propositions (2010). In light of this, he 
urges that we should reverse the order of explanation. That is, we should understand 
the fact that an agent represents things as thus and so as being the conceptual basis of 
representation. In other words, propositions are representational in virtue of their 
connection to agential representational activity (Soames 2014: 96). 
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On this picture, the primary instances of representation are concrete events, where 
these are certain cognitive performances or actions or operations. The basic building 
block is the notion of entertaining a proposition. What entertaining amounts to in each 
case depends on the nature of the proposition in question. The simplest case of 
entertaining a proposition is predication, understood as a cognitive act. For example, 
consider the concrete act of an agent predicating redness of a ball. With these concrete 
events taken as basic, propositions are then understood as the minimal event type that 
corresponds to such concrete events. It is minimal in the sense that it is what is 
representationally common to any arbitrary agent predicating redness of a ball. Thus, a 
proposition derives its representationality from the representationality of concrete 
events. We then say that a proposition is true just in case things are the way that the 
proposition represents them as being (2014: 96). 
Of course, propositions are often more complex than subject-predicate form. So more 
complexity needs to be introduced. Generally, the various ways of entertaining a 
proposition can be given as follows: 
 
The simplest are those in which properties are predicated of objects. Complex propositions 
may involve other operations such as conjoining, disjoining, and negating properties or 
propositions, as well as operating on, for example a two-place relation R to form the reflexive, 
one-place property self-R-ing. They may also involve applications of functions to objects, or to 
properties (or propositional functions). In addition, some complex propositions involve the 
ascription of higher-order properties to lower-order properties (or propositional functions) as 
in quantification. Propositions of any sort may also be arguments of further predications, 
which we find in modal propositions and attitude ascriptions[...] (2014: 99) 
 
And so on. The basic idea is the same as with predication. For whatever way a 
proposition represents something as being, we find the corresponding mental act that 
represents the world as being that way. 
With the basic cognitive activity of entertaining a proposition in place, propositional 
attitudes can be introduced as attitudes that involve entertaining a proposition in some 
way (2014: 97). For example, to judge that x is F is to affirm or endorse that predication 
in thought and in reasoning. To believe that x is F is to be disposed to judge that 
predication. To assert that x is F is to commit oneself and to treat oneself as entitled to 
the predication through a communicative linguistic act. To know that x is F is something 
like to be justified in believing the predication when it is true. And so on. 
It is not a huge step to see how this account of propositions might dovetail with an 
expressivist approach to moral discourse. If one identifies propositions with cognitive 
event types, then one might think that to provide an account of the content of a claim in 
terms of the type of mental state it expresses more or less is just to provide an account of 
the content of a claim in terms of the proposition it expresses. This is what Ridge 
endorses. The only difference is that, as with the notion of belief, 'cognitive event type' 
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should be understood in a similarly broad sense, to cover both moral beliefs and 
descriptive beliefs (2014: 128).17 In this way, Ridge hopes to identify types of moral 
thoughts as instances of entertaining moral propositions.  
Granting Soames' view of propositions, simply recommending that the relevant 
kinds of cognitive event type comprising propositions should be broadened is not itself 
sufficient to guarantee the propositionality of moral thought and language. This is 
because the cognitive event type needs to display the right sort of structure in order to 
adequately play the role of propositions. In the descriptive case, it is easy to see that 
entertaining representational propositions will meet this requirement. This is because 
for any proposition p, there is an isomorphism between the cognitive event type of 
entertaining p and p itself. In the nondescriptive case, however, it cannot simply be 
assumed that the cognitive event type corresponding to the relevant kind of judgment 
will possess the properties required of it. It is in answer to this question that the 
motivation for developing a hybrid account becomes apparent. The basic strategy in 
accounting for the propositionality of moral discourse is to 'offload' the work required 
onto the representational component of moral judgment. 
Beginning with compositionality, any account of moral thought needs to provide a 
fully general and recursive account of how any arbitrarily complex moral sentence gets 
its content. Ridge argues that this work can be offloaded to the representational belief 
component of a proposition in the following way (2014: 120). Consider the claim, 'If 
pleasure is good as an end, then Socrates sought pleasure'. Like other moral judgments, 
this is a relational state involving a noncognitive normative perspective related 
appropriately to a representational belief. For an agent who makes this judgment, the 
normative perspective is the same as that which would be involved in an atomic moral 
judgment (normative perspectives are maximal at a time). The content of the 
representational belief is then 'If pleasure would be highly ranked as an end by any 
admissible standard of practical reasoning, then Socrates sought pleasure', where 
'admissible standards' refers to those not ruled out by the agent's normative perspective. 
More generally: 
 
Take any logically complex sentence S in which a normative predicate is used (and not just 
mentioned)[...] S expresses (a) a normative perspective, and (b) the belief s*, where s* is what 
one gets when one takes 'S' and replaces all occurrences of normative predicates in 'S' with the 
obviously corresponding phrases about what any admissible standard would be like in the 
relevant way. (2014: 145) 
 
                                                          
17 I follow Ridge here in using 'cognitive' to be more or less synonymous with 'mental'. One might 
understand 'cognitive' here to simply mean representational; perhaps Soames does. However, I have 
opted to stick with using 'cognitive' for readability, though nothing substantive turns on this. If the 
reader so wishes, she may replace each use of 'cognitive' with 'mental'. 
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In this way, we "thereby get a fully general and recursive" account "of how each claim 
gets its propositional content." (2014: 130) This is achieved by having systematically 
explained the kind of mental state type expressed by any arbitrary complex moral claim. 
It also needs to be shown that moral judgments have the right sort of logical 
properties. For example, it needs to be shown how logical validity applies to moral 
discourse. As before, Ridge explains these features of by offloading the work to the 
representational aspect of moral propositions. All that is then required is to 
'psychologise' the orthodox approach to so that it can be situated into the broader 
expressivist framework. To this effect, Ridge defines validity as follows: 
 
An argument is valid just in case any possible believer who accepts all of the premises but at 
one and the same time denies the conclusion would thereby be guaranteed to have 
inconsistent beliefs, where this remains true on any acceptable substitution of the non-logical 
terms of the argument. (2014: 156) 
 
An 'acceptable substitution' is a substitution of terms of the 'same semantic kind'. Note 
that Ridge requires an account of validity in terms of the commitments of a believer, 
because the representational beliefs contained within moral judgments necessarily 
contain the indexical predicate 'any admissible standard'. So without indexing validity 
to a particular speaker in this way, there would be no guarantee of validity, as different 
people will judge according to different standards. 
With validity so defined, it can then be shown how validity can be applied to moral 
arguments. Consider the following argument: 
 
(P1) If one lives in a glass house, one ought not to throw stones. 
(P2) John lives in a glass house. 
(C) So, John ought not to throw stones. 
 
To see whether the argument is valid, we need to see what results from accepting (P1) 
and (P2) while denying (C). More particularly, we need to see whether accepting the 
premises and the negation of the conclusion results in having inconsistent 
representational beliefs. 
(P1) and (P2) are normative claims that involve a representational belief indexed to a 
normative perspective. Thus, someone who accepts the premises but denies the 
conclusion is committed to (something like) the following three claims: 
 
(P1) For any agent A, if A lives in a glass house, then A's throwing stones is ruled out 
by any admissible standard of practical reasoning. 
(P2) John lives in a glass house. 
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(¬C) John's throwing stones is not ruled out by any admissible standard of practical 
reasoning. 
 
(P1), (P2) and (¬C) are all representational beliefs. As such, we can simply look to their 
contents to see whether they can together be consistently maintained by any possible 
agent. It seems clear that they cannot, for any two of the beliefs held together rule out 
the remaining belief. As such, the original modus ponens argument comes out valid. 
Note how it seems to avoid one of the problems Schroeder faced, concerning the 
logic of propositions. His problem, recall, was that by identifying propositions with 
properties, he needed the relevant properties to have the same logical and 
compositional relations as propositions. It was argued that he failed in this respect, and 
that this aspect of his account placed severe constraints on what the right kind of 
properties could be. However, representational contents here have exactly the right kind 
of form. Indeed, in the case of representational belief, the representational content just is 
the propositional content. As such, no parallel problem arises. 
In summary, Ridge aims to accommodate moral propositions within Ecumenical 
Expressivism by identifying the proposition p with cognitive event type of entertaining 
the proposition that p. In the simplest case, to entertain p is to predicate F of x. However, 
as moral thoughts are relational states containing a noncognitive aspect, Ecumenical 
Expressivism must explain how states other than simple representational states can play 
the role required of propositions. Ridge's general strategy is to offload this work to the 
representational beliefs that in part constitute moral judgment. In this way, it hopes to 
explain the propositionality of moral language from a nondescriptivist viewpoint. 
 
2.3.2 A Lack of Entertainment: A Problem for Ecumenical Expressivism 
 
Soames' account takes representational cognitive acts to be the building blocks from 
which to construct a theory of propositions. He is explicit in understanding propositions 
as essentially representational. Indeed, propositions are individuated in terms of what is 
minimally representationally common to all possible instances of the proposition 
(Soames 2014: 96). Ridge, however, cannot accept this. If he did, then moral judgments 
would be wrongly identified with the representational belief component of a moral 
judgment. This is because the hybrid state and the representational belief have exactly 
the same representational content―the hybrid state has no representational content 
over and above that of the descriptive belief component. So the criterion of identity for 
propositions must differ depending on whether the proposition is descriptive or 
nondescriptive. 
This might not seem too worrying. In many ways, this simply mirrors what has 
already been said about moral belief. While there are robustly representational beliefs, 
there are also deflationary beliefs. The former are individuated by their representational 
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content. The latter are individuated by specifying the kind of mental state expressed by 
the corresponding claims. So the way to individuate moral propositions must be to 
identify the minimal event type that corresponds to the various concrete instances of 
particular moral judgments. 
Recall that for Soames, the most basic building block in his theory of propositions is 
the notion of entertaining a proposition. To entertain a proposition is to perform is a 
cognitive achievement, it is something one does. In the simplest case, to entertain the 
proposition that x is F just is to predicate F-ness of x. We thereby represent x as being F. 
Here, the notion of entertaining a proposition is explained in terms of our 
representational activity―the latter is prior in the order of explanation. Moreover, 
entertaining a proposition does not here simply mean the propositional attitude that one 
has when one consciously considers a proposition in consciousness without judging, 
doubting, wondering, or whatever. Entertaining a proposition just is the 
representational activity one engages in. This is what makes entertaining a proposition 
the foundational cognitive activity from which to understand all other propositional 
attitudes. Entertaining a proposition is not contrasted with judging a proposition. 
Rather, judging a proposition involves entertaining a proposition. For example, judging 
that snow is white involves predicating whiteness of snow, which is to say, involves 
entertaining the proposition that snow is white. 
So a representational proposition is identified with the cognitive event type of 
entertaining that proposition, which is in turn identified with a cognitive 
representational act (e.g. predication). This event type is what representational beliefs 
have as their contents. So what according to Ridge is the kind of cognitive event type 
that moral propositions are to be identified as being? The relevant class of cognitive 
event types needs to be broadened to include moral propositions; predicating using a 
moral predicate cannot be of the same kind of thing as predicating using descriptive 
predicates. Soames' gives us an account of the latter. What kind of thing plays the 
analogous role in the moral case?  
Ridge provides an account of what it is to 'merely' entertain a moral proposition. 
Drawing from simulation theory, he suggests that to merely entertain a moral 
proposition is to have a merely simulated normative perspective paired with the 
corresponding descriptive belief (2014: 128). However, this fails to pick out the cognitive 
activity of entertaining a moral proposition in the relevant sense. Recall that entertaining 
a proposition is something we do when we judge, for example. What is needed is a 
general cognitive activity that is present across all propositional attitudes, and which 
our propositional attitudes can be defined in terms of. Clearly the simulation account will 
not work here, as it would involve defining judgment in terms of accepting or affirming 
a simulation of judgment in thought. This gets things the wrong way around. Judgment 
is conceptually prior to simulation, not vice versa. So simulation of judgment cannot be 
the cognitive event type that moral propositions can be identified as being. 
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To be fair to Ridge, it is not clear he intends simulation to play this role. Rather, 
simulation is suggested as a plausible candidate for what we are doing when we 'merely 
entertain', say, that stealing is wrong. However, Ridge simply fails to identify any 
cognitive event type that can do the work of entertaining a proposition in Soames' sense. 
Rather, vague talk is given about 'ways in which' one might entertain a moral 
proposition (2014: 128). For example, judging, hoping, or 'merely entertaining' 
(simulating) that stealing is wrong are all ways in which one might entertain that 
proposition. However, this tells us nothing about what cognitive event types moral 
propositions actually are. Moreover, given that they are, to at least some extent, 
different in kind to descriptive propositions, we have not been given any reason to think 
that there actually are any such nondescriptive cognitive events from which to construct 
a class of cognitive event types corresponding to moral propositions.  
So Ridge fails to identify any cognitive event type that moral propositions could be. 
The situation is worse, in fact, when one considers that the only natural candidate 
would be entertaining the representational proposition of the belief component of moral 
judgment. After all, it is this component of moral judgment that explains the 
propositionality of moral thought. So if one accepts Soames' account of propositions 
together with a hybrid theory of moral judgment, then there is great pressure to identify 
moral propositions with the representational contents of the belief component. 
However, this would be to embrace descriptivism. 
Perhaps one might argue against this move by claiming that the theoretical benefits 
of not making this identification (in other words, the benefits of nondescriptivism) 
justify positing some other cognitive event type to be moral propositions. Particularly, 
that cognitive event type that is common across all instances of the proposition being 
cognised. However, insofar as (i) we have yet to see any possible, let alone plausible, 
nonrepresentational candidate to play this role, and (ii) there is an obvious 
representational candidate that can play this role, any such move is implausibly ad hoc 
and cannot be accepted. 
 
The pressure to identify moral propositions with the representational contents of the 
belief component not only arises from there being an absence of other candidates. There 
is some positive reason for making this identification, insofar as one accepts Soames' 
theory and one agrees with the general account of moral judgment according to 
Ecumenical Expressivism, modulo its commitment to nondescriptivism. This has to do 
with the distinction between judgment and belief. In metaethics, 'judgment' is often 
used as a theoretically neutral term to describe the mental state characteristic of moral 
thought. The dialectic purpose of this is to not beg any questions as to whether moral 
judgments are beliefs or some other attitude. This is the sense in which Ridge generally 
uses the term. However, this terminology is somewhat unfortunate, as there is another 
sense in which judgments are distinct from beliefs. This is the sense in which while a 
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belief is a state, a judgment is an event. One has beliefs over time, whereas one judges at 
a time. A judgment is something that one does―it is active in a way that belief is not. 
Belief is more like a dispositional state, whereas a judgment is a sort of cognitive 
achievement. The two are intimately connected―as was seen above, one rough way of 
glossing their relation is that to believe that p is to be disposed to judge that p. Whatever 
their precise connection, it is plausible that belief and judgment in this sense belong to 
two distinct metaphysical categories. 
Consider now the following. Ecumenical Expressivism defined moral judgment as a 
relational state. What, then, is the event that constitutes moral judgment in the active 
sense? Ridge suggests the following: "Normative beliefs, then, are dispositions which 
give rise to normative judgments, where these are the relevant descriptive 
judgment/normative perspective pair." (2014: 128) This is puzzling as the only active 
component in moral judgment is the descriptive judgment. Normative perspectives do 
not have active counterparts in the same way that beliefs do. However, if judgments are 
events, then how could a moral judgment be pair of which one of its constituents is a 
state? Perhaps two events might plausibly be conjoined to make a single event, but it is 
unclear that an event could consist of an event and a state. If anything, this looks like a 
form of Ecumenical Cognitivism, in which the presence of a normative might be 
necessary, but the content of the moral claim―the moral proposition―just is the content 
of the representational belief. 
One might make the following reply. While normative perspectives are 
synchronically static, they are diachronically fluid. Indeed, they must be if we are ever 
to change our minds about moral matters. Say that after engaging in moral reasoning, I 
come to acquire a new moral belief that p, where 'belief that p' is understood as 
deflationary belief. When I acquire this belief, I make a descriptive judgment that 
corresponds to the representational belief component. However, I have done more than 
this: my normative perspective has also changed. So could a normative judgment 
consist in the occurrence of these two events?  
The answer is no, and the reason is simple. While some of my judgments may occur 
this way, many others do not. It is simply not a necessary condition for moral judgment 
that my normative perspective changes. Say that it is a long standing belief of mine that 
investing in nuclear arms is morally wrong. I can in principle make this judgment at any 
point in which I have this belief. So most of my judgments occur without any change in 
normative perspective. In fact, it seems possible that I could come to have this belief 
before making a judgment, for we form many of our beliefs unconsciously. So the reply 
fails. 
Let's take stock. Ridge aimed to adapt Soames' theory of propositions to Ecumenical 
Expressivism. At the heart of Soames' theory is the notion of entertaining a proposition, 
which is a technical term to capture the distinctively representational activity that we 
engage in representing the world in thought. Propositions were then identified with 
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such cognitive event types. As entertaining in this sense is essentially representational, 
the notion needed to be broadened to include the cognitive event type that is distinctive 
of moral judgment as per Ecumenical Expressivism. However, Ridge fails to tell us what 
the relevant cognitive event type involved in our moral attitudes is. Therefore, he fails to 
provide an account of what moral propositions are. Furthermore, it was argued that it is 
unclear what the cognitive event type for moral proposition could be under Ecumenical 
Expressivism other than the representational belief component of moral judgment. 
However, if this were correct, then our account of moral thought and language would 
be descriptivist, as the contents of moral claims and beliefs would be a representational 
content. Particularly, this would yield a form of subjectivism. This is because the 
normative term 'acceptable standard' would reduce to the descriptive term 'admissible 
standard'. So the truth-conditions for moral claims would be a matter of what standards 
the speaker as a matter of fact does and does not accept. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we examined whether propositional nondescriptivism could be achieved 
by distinguishing propositions from representational contents in an expressivist 
framework. It was argued that Schroeder's attempt failed as he did not provide a 
plausible account of descriptive propositions, and that Ridge's attempt failed as he did 
not provide a plausible account of nondescriptive propositions. It seems that we cannot 
adequately account for one kind of proposition except at the expense of the other. I 
therefore conclude that this approach should be rejected. 
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~ 3 ~ 
Metasemantics and Inferentialism 
 
In this thesis, we have been exploring the suggestion that metaethical nondescriptivism 
and propositional semantics are compatible. In the previous chapter, we examined two 
approaches that provided nonrepresentational accounts of what moral propositions are. 
In this chapter, we take a step back to examine in a more holistic way the relation 
between one's semantic theory and one's metasemantic theory for moral language. The 
thought is that propositional nondescriptivism might be achieved by formulating 
nondescriptivism as a metasemantic theory. It is argued that if metaethics is properly 
conducted at the level of metasemantics, then semantic concerns about propositionality 
are orthogonal to the descriptivism/nondescriptivism debate. After motivating this 
claim generally, I examine the semantics and metasemantics for 'ought' developed by 
Matthew Chrisman. While I argue that Chrisman fails to successfully make the case for 
metasemantic nondescriptivism, I tentatively suggest a way in which this approach 
might be vindicated. 
 
3.1 Semantics and Metasemantics 
 
What is the difference between semantics and metasemantics? There are a number of 
places in which this distinction can, and indeed has, been drawn. My aim in this section 
is not to argue for a definitive distinction between these two domains of inquiry. Rather, 
I hope to bring out two quite general but distinct kinds of concern that are characteristic 
of each domain respectively. This will serve to show how nondescriptivism might 
plausibly be thought to concern the metasemantics of moral language rather than the 
semantics. This provides a way of arguing for the compatibility of propositional or 
truth-conditional semantics and nondescriptivism. 
It should be emphasised that neither semantics nor metasemantics displays clear 
boundaries anyway as to its scope, method, and explanatory goals. Moreover, many 
issues may be to a greater or lesser extent the concern of both. So there is some scope as 
to where one chooses to draw the line. In any case, whether the distinction pays 
dividends or not will depend on the work one puts it to in one's theory. As I will be 
using the terms, I take neither semantics nor metasemantics to be exhaustive of the kind 
of inquiry that might go by those names.  
Recall Gibbard's dictum and the question it raised. To explain the meaning of a term, 
explain the state of mind the term can be used to express. Yes, very well, but explain what? 
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Philosophical literature is rife with claims to explain the meaning of various 
expressions. The problem is that there are a whole number of things that one might wish 
to explain about an expression's meaning. Some aspects about meaning will probably 
not be relevant to philosophical inquiry―etymological explanation, for instance.1 For 
example, perhaps we want to know why a word has a certain meaning rather than 
another. Or perhaps we want to know why it has any meaning at all. Or perhaps we 
want an explanation that tells us what it is for an expression to have a certain meaning, 
or to be meaningful generally. Or perhaps there is some peculiar aspect of some 
particular expression that calls for an explanation, perhaps in light of other things we 
know about it. Or perhaps all that is wanted is an explanation of what a term actually 
means. 
So there are in principle any number of things that we might wish to explain in 
relation to the meaning of a term. Here is a general distinction that one might make 
between two classes of explanations: 
  
Insofar as linguistic semantics aspires to 'specify' or 'report' the meanings of sentences and 
sub-sentential expressions (in some systematic way), philosophy of language could on to tell 
us how or why these symbols come to have those meanings―perhaps unearthing more basic 
or fundamental facts in virtue of which such semantic states of affairs obtain. We take this 
second sort of inquiry to be paradigmatic, if not exhaustive, of metasemantics. (Burgess and 
Sherman 2014a: 1-2)  
 
In this way, we can distinguish between 'linguistic' semantics, which is an empirical 
inquiry into the semantic properties of expressions (compositionality 
particularly―more on this shortly), and metasemantics, which is a metaphysical inquiry 
about linguistic semantics and the results that it supplies.2  
We can further distinguish two basic sorts of metaphysical explanation that might be 
relevant. First, there are grounding explanations, which explain that in virtue of which 
some semantic theory is true of a language. Second, there are constitutive explanations, 
which explain what the facts or properties of some semantic theory consist in.3 Both 
kinds of explanation can either be directed to explain the meanings of particular 
expressions, or meaningfulness more generally. Talking loosely, we might speak of the 
metaphysics of meaning in terms of the nature of some language or fragment. I don't 
intend to commit to any particular conceptions of what these kind of explanations 
consist in. However, I hope the sense in which each is metaphysical, at least in a broad 
sense of the term, is clear. 
                                                          
1 Not to say that etymologies are always irrelevant as explanandum or explanans. The etymological 
mode of explanation, however, does not seem to be in the remit of philosophy.  
2 Burgess and Sherman take their terminological lead from Kaplan (1989: 573-4). 
3 I'll speak loosely throughout of semantic properties and facts. I don't intend to take on any particular 
commitments by such talk, as will become clear by the end of the chapter. 
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Most philosophers who use the above distinction or something like it are fairly 
agreed that grounding explanations (broadly construed) are in the scope of 
metasemantics. However, there is divergence as to whether constitutive explanations 
ought to be included. For example, Brandom, distinguishes 'formal semantics' which is 
concerned "with computing the semantic values of some expressions from those of 
others", from 'philosophical semantics' which is concerned with "what kind of semantic 
values expressions should be taken to have," as well what grounds particular meanings 
and meaning in general (2010a: 342 emphasis added).4 On the other side, Stalnaker 
distinguishes 'descriptive semantics' from metasemantics, where the former includes 
saying "what kinds of things the semantic values of expressions of various categories are" 
in addition accounting for compositionality; metasemantics exclusively concerns 
grounding explanations (1997: 540 emphasis added).5 
I take it that the main reason for wanting constitutive explanations of meanings to be 
in the scope of one's metasemantics resides in the metaphysical nature of the question. It 
seems conceivable that we could agree on all the semantic facts while disagreeing over 
what these facts consist in. I take that the main reason against including it is the fact that 
constitutive explanations involve identity conditions of semantic facts. We'll return to 
this question in further detail in the discussion of Chrisman's metasemantics in the later 
section of this chapter, so I'll leave the issue hanging for now. Contrary to appearances, 
we will see that this is not merely a terminological dispute. 
By contrast to metasemantics, semantics is an empirical inquiry into the semantic 
properties of natural language. The particular branch of semantics that concerns us here 
is compositional semantics. The basic idea is to show how the meanings of sentences are 
a function of the meaning of their parts and their mode of composition. While 
compositional semantics is likewise explanatory in ambitions, the explanation is in this 
case not metaphysical. Rather, it aims to explain our ability to speak and understand a 
language based on only a limited knowledge of vocabulary. It is generally thought that 
if meaning were not compositional in this way, then the language would be unlearnable, 
as we would lack any explanation of how we can produce and consume an indefinite 
number of novel sentences.6 In this way, compositional semantics explains "how an 
infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite accomplishments. For suppose that a 
language lacks this feature; then no matter how many sentences a would-be speaker 
learns to produce and understand, there will remain others whose meanings are not 
given by the rules already mastered." (Davidson 1984a: 8)  
So the meanings or semantic values of complex expressions are given as a function of 
the semantic values that have been assigned to the primitive expressions of the language 
or fragment under consideration. One prominent way in which to model the semantic 
                                                          
4 See also Burgess and Sherman (2014a) and Pérez Carballo (2014). 
5 See also Ridge (2014) and Yalcin (2014). 
6 This thought goes back at least to Frege (1963: 1). 
42 
 
value of expressions is in terms of how they contribute to the truth-conditions of the 
propositions expressed by the sentences in which they figure.7 Whether the model 
provides a correct representation of the compositional properties under examination can 
be tested by seeing if the intuitive truth-conditions of sentences match those predicted 
by the model. In the sense of compositional semantics being discussed, it is important to 
understand exactly what the predictive power of the semantics consists in: "Empirical 
power in such a theory depends on success in recovering the structure of a very 
complicated ability―the ability to speak and understand language." (Davidson 1984b: 
24, emphasis added) 
That this is the primary explanandum is important to keep in mind because it can 
otherwise obscure what a truth-conditional semantics need and need not be committed 
to. For example, suppose we understand sentences to express propositions, the 
composition of which determines the truth value of the sentence. Using propositions in 
this way allows us to track commonality of content across a wide variety of linguistic 
contexts, such as embedding and attitude ascriptions. However, propositions are here 
understood simply as elements in a formal model. What matters here are their formal or 
structural properties.8 
In other words, for the purposes of compositional semantics, we simply understand 
propositions in whatever way best represents the formal properties of the compositional 
properties of sentences, whether this be as a structured entity, a set of possible worlds, a 
function to possible worlds, or whatever. In and of itself, this saying nothing about the 
nature or properties of the expressions in question over and above their formal 
compositional structure. Compare Yalcin: 
 
It is a platitude that modeling a class of properties is, generally speaking, simply not the same 
as offering some kind of translation procedure operating on the bearers of those properties, 
and neither is it the same as giving an interpretation procedure in some intentional sense, or 
in the sense familiar from artificial languages. This platitude should be respected, even when 
what is to be modeled are the semantic properties of natural language, and even when the 
modeling proceeds using formal tools developed originally for stipulating model-theoretic 
interpretations for artificial languages. One can use model-theoretic tools to model meaning 
properties without assuming that in doing so, one must be associating expressions with their 
supposed referents or representational contents. Again, while that kind of gloss may be 
natural when one is using such tools to stipulate referents or meanings in an artificial language 
(for, say, logic or mathematics), it is question-begging, and must be justified, when the tools 
are deployed in connection with the empirical study of natural language. (2014: 45) 
 
                                                          
7 For simplicitly, I'll ignore the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional truth-
conditional semantics. 
8 c.f. Davdison: "we must be able to specify, in a way that depends effectively and solely on formal 
considerations, what every sentence means." (1984a: 8, emphasis added) 
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The point is that, as an empirical study of natural language, compositional semantics 
should be able to use model-theoretic tools to model the compositional properties of 
language without taking on any particular metaphysical commitments―for example, 
some particular conception of propositions. This is as it should be. As Pérez Carballo 
notes: "semanticists are not in the business of pronouncing on metaphysical issues. It 
would be incredible if the viability of current semantic theory as we know it depended 
on the outcome of a controversial metaphysical dispute." (2014: 136)  
The relevance to debates about descriptivism and nondescriptivism should by now 
be apparent. It is often assumed that nondescriptivism is incompatible with 
propositional or truth-conditional semantics. However, if semantics is metaphysically 
neutral in the way being suggested, then it is prima facie unclear why these must be 
incompatible. This is in fact not a new point, and was observed by Davidson in his early 
work on semantics: 
 
If we suppose questions of logical grammar settled, sentences like "Bardot is good" raise no 
special problems for a truth definition. The deep differences between descriptive and evaluative 
(emotive, expressive, etc.) terms do not show here. Even if we hold there is some important sense 
in which moral or evaluative sentences do not have a truth value (for example, because they 
cannot be "verified"), we ought not to bottle at "'Bardot is good' is true if and only if Bardot is 
good"; in a theory of truth, this consequence should follow with the rest, keeping track, as 
must be done, of the semantic location of such sentences in the language as a whole―of their 
relation to generalizations, their role in such compound sentences as "Bardot is good and 
Bardot is foolish," and so on. What is special to evaluative words is simply not touched: the 
mystery is transferred from the word 'good' in the object-language to its translation in the 
meta-language. (1984b: 31, emphasis added) 
 
There are two key points to take from this. First, compositional semantics as empirical 
theory should be able to proceed fairly autonomously, using whatever theoretical tools 
best predict the semantic values of sentences. Second, propositional and truth-
conditional compositional semantics are in principle compatible with nondescriptivism.  
'In principle' is an important qualification here. For it might turn out that no 
nondescriptivist theory could be made to fit the results of the semantics. This depends 
both on what the results of the semantics are, and how the nondescriptivist theory is 
formulated. The point is that there is no reason to rule this out from the outset. Let us 
now turn, therefore, to examine Chrisman's semantics and metasemantics for 'ought'. 
 
3.2 Chrisman on the Meaning of 'Ought' 
 
As well as being perhaps the most developed nondescriptivist theory that utilises the 
distinction between semantics and metasemantics, Chrisman's (2015) theory is also 
noteworthy for its inferentialist rather than expressivist articulation of 
nondescriptivism. Chrisman develops a truth-conditional semantics for 'ought', in 
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which it is modelled as a special kind of necessity modal. These semantics are then used 
to argue for a nondescriptivist inferentialist metasemantic explanation of that in virtue 
of which the semantics for 'ought' are true. (Thus, Chrisman sides with Brandom―more 
than once, as we shall see.) The general approach of this thesis has been to see what does 
and does not follow given nondescriptivism. We have not generally been concerned with 
arguments for nondescriptivism. Nonetheless, it will be helpful to outline Chrisman's 
arguments as it will help to show the nature of the relation between semantics and 
metasemantics, which is the central theme of this chapter.    
 
3.2.1 Semantics for 'Ought' 
 
Whereas we have been more concerned with moral language generally, Chrisman is 
primarily concerned with the term 'ought'. While many of the contexts in which we 
make ought-claims are moral, there are a number of other contexts in which we use the 
term. For example, we make prudential claims about what we ought to do to promote 
our welfare; we make teleological claims about what we ought to do given some end; 
we make evaluative claims about what states of affairs we think ought to obtain; and we 
make epistemic claims about what ought to be the case given what we know or believe 
(2015: 32-3). The same ought-sentence might be used in a number of these contexts, and 
no doubt there are other contexts as well. The point is simply that 'ought' can be used in 
various different sorts of context. 
Chrisman thinks that this places fairly strong constraints on any semantics for 
'ought'.  Initially, one might think that the term is many-ways ambiguous. Like the word 
'bank', we have a single sign that we use to express different expressions with distinct 
meanings.9 Unlike 'bank', however, 'ought' is not given distinct dictionary entries 
depending on which kind of 'ought' is meant. Moreover, the different kinds of 'ought' 
are not translated into distinct words in foreign languages, as with 'bank'. Rather, like 
other modal auxiliary verbs, such as 'may' and 'must', "there appears to be a deep intra- 
and interlinguistic systematicity to the semantic contribution of 'ought' to the sentences 
in which it figures." (Chrisman 2015: 42) 
If 'ought' were ambiguous, then these linguistic facts would be a huge unexplained 
coincidence. Thus, any plausible semantics for 'ought' must be sensitive to the wide 
variety of ought-claims, not just moral ones. Chrisman argues that such constraints give 
us good reason to reject analyses of ought in terms of other normative notions, such as 
obligations, reasons, and values.10 Rather, 'ought' should be understood as a primitive or 
                                                          
9 c.f. Harman (1973: 235). 
10 On obligations (2015: 36-7); on reasons (2015: 43-51); on values (2015: 52-8). A central theme is that no 
analysis successfully captures every "flavor" of 'ought'. It should probably be noted that Chrisman does 
not take these arguments to be conclusive. Rather, they are meant to show that there is prima facie good 
reason to treat 'ought' as a primitive normative term. 
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fundamental normative notion. So we need a uniform semantics that does not reduce 
'ought' to any other normative notion. 
We are after an account of 'ought' that provides a perspicuous representation of how 
its meaning of systematically contributes to the meaning of the sentences in which it 
figures. Chrisman thinks this is best done by representing the meaning of the term as a 
function to truth-values (relative to a context and world of evaluation). However, it 
should be kept in mind that at this stage of the inquiry the semantic notions are used 
only as tools to represent the compositional properties of expressions. The framework is 
assumed to be theoretically neutral as to whether 'ought' is descriptive or 
nondescriptive. We can therefore associate ought-sentences with propositions, which 
determine the truth-conditions for those sentences, without (yet) making any 
commitments as to the fundamental nature of such language.  
As we have already observed, 'ought' is a modal auxiliary verb, similar to 'can' and 
'must'. We might therefore expect it to function semantically in the same way as alethic 
modal operators. Looking first to modal logic, the semantics for necessity operator '□' 
and possibility operator '' can be given respectively in term of universal and existential 
quantification over a set of possible worlds. These expressions operate as functions from 
a 'prejacent' proposition to a truth value, relativised to a world of evaluation and 
accessibility relation. Truth simpliciter is truth at the actual world, and different 
accessibility relations can be defined to model different kinds of alethic modality. For 
example, nomological necessity can be represented as universal quantification over all 
possible worlds that are consistent with the laws of nature that hold at the world of 
evaluation. 
At a first pass, we can treat 'ought' as a necessity modal by defining the appropriate 
accessibility relation. Generally, the semantic value of 'ought' could be given as follows:  
 
(1) ⟦ought⟧R;w = p : ⟦ought(p)⟧w = 1 iff ⟦p⟧w = 1 in all worlds R-accessible from w.  
(2015: 72) 
 
We then define the relevant accessibility relation for each kind of ought-claim. For 
example, this might be defined in the moral case as follows: 
 
Rmoral   =def the relation that holds between two worlds w and w iff what is morally 
ideal in w is true in w. (2015: 69) 
 
This gives us the following semantic value for the moral 'ought': 
 
(2) ⟦ought⟧R-moral;w = p : ⟦ought(p)⟧w = 1 iff ⟦p⟧w = 1 in all worlds Rmoral-accessible from 
w. (2015: 70) 
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In other words, 'ought' is a unary function that maps propositions to the semantic value 
true just in case that proposition is true at all morally ideal worlds at w. We can now 
derive the truth-conditions for ought-claims as follows: 
 
(3) 'ought(p)' is true in w just in case p is true in all worlds Rmoral-accessible from w. 
 
So, for example, consider the sentence:  
 
(4) 'The Levite ought to have helped the wounded traveller.' 
 
This sentence is true just in case the Levite (or his counterpart) helped the wounded 
traveller in all morally ideal worlds―i.e., all worlds in which what ought to be the case 
(in the actual world) is the case.  
Plausibly, the Levite ought to have had mercy on the traveller, and so (4) is 
intuitively true. However, under plausible assumptions, (2) predicts that (4) is false. In a 
morally ideal world, the traveller would not have been robbed and wounded in the first 
place. So it is not the case that in any morally ideal world, the Levite ought to have 
helped the traveller―there would be no need. These are examples of non-ideal contexts. 
Another kind of problem case for (2) are moral dilemmas. If two moral ideals issue 
incompatible demands on an agent, the set of morally ideal worlds might simply be 
empty, trivialising all moral ought sentences. While it might be questioned whether 
moral dilemmas actually exist, this is a substantive moral question that should not be 
ruled out by one's semantics (Chrisman 2015: 79-80). 
Drawing on Kratzer (1981, 1991), Chrisman suggests that we replace Rmoral with a 
contextually determined modal base and ordering source to which 'ought' is relativised 
(2015: 84-6). Very roughly, the modal base is the set of possible worlds that are 
consistent with a contextually determined set of background conditions. So, for 
example, in the good Samaritan case, the relevant background conditions include the 
fact that the traveller was robbed and wounded. Secondly, rather than selecting the 
ideal worlds in the modal base, we instead have a contextually determined ordering 
source that sorts the worlds in the modal base into a partial ranking. In the moral case, 
the ordering source is determined by something like the set of propositions that state 
what is considered best by moral norms. As the ordering is partial, this allows for 
worlds to be ranked equally. 
Where c denotes a context, f(w) denotes the modal base, and <g(w) denotes the 
ordering source, we can now give the semantic value of 'ought' as follows: 
 
(5) ⟦ought⟧f,g;w  =  p : ⟦ought(p)⟧c;w = 1 iff ⟦p⟧c;w = 1 in all worlds v∩f(w), for which 
there is no vf(w) such that v<g(w)v. (2015: 86) 
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In other words, 'ought' is a function from a proposition that gives the semantic value 
true just in case the proposition is true in all the worlds in the modal base for which 
there are no higher ranked worlds by the ordering source.11  
As well as dealing with non-ideal contexts, (5) also solves the problem of moral 
dilemmas. Two worlds that are morally ideal according to conflicting norms may be 
jointly ranked highest by the ordering source, where the semantic value of 'ought' 
makes no reference to morally ideal worlds. However, Chrisman argues that (5) is 
inadequate because it fails to capture the agentive nature of certain kinds of ought-
claim, such as in moral contexts (2015: 108-12). There is an intuitive distinction between 
'ought-to-be' and 'ought-to-do', in the sense that while some ought-claims are used to 
say what ought to be true, many are used to say what an agent should do.12 As the 
prejacent in (5) is a proposition, one might worry that this does not adequately capture 
the active agency of 'ought-to-do' claims.  
Sceptical of attempts to capture such agency within the prejacent proposition or by 
adding an 'agent parameter' to index ought-claims to, Chrisman suggests 'ought-to-be' 
takes 'practitions' rather than propositions for prejacents (2015: 136-9). Originally 
developed by Castañeda (1975), practitions are nonpropositional imperative-like 
contents with a structure and satisfaction conditions analogous to standard subject-
predicate propositions. For example, the sentence: 
 
(6) 'Ludwig, put it down!'  
 
expresses the structured practition in which 'put it down' is 'predicated' of Ludwig. (6) is 
correct or incorrect relative to a norm in the form 'if in C, do φ, don't ...'. For example, 
this might be the norm expressed by the sentence, 'If listening to a visiting lecturer, do 
not threaten them with a poker...'.  
While Chrisman thinks that the 'challenge of ought-to-do' poses a substantial 
problem for (5), I think he overstates the case. The challenge is largely motivated from 
the idea that there is intuitively an important conceptual distinction to be made between 
the two kinds of ought-claim. However, given that the point of the compositional 
semantics is simply to model the compositional properties of expressions, conceptual 
considerations are not obviously relevant. This only becomes a real problem for (5) if it 
fails to correctly predict the correct truth-conditions. In any case, we need not dwell on 
such questions here. The key point for Chrisman regarding nondescriptivism is that 
'ought' is best understood semantically as a modal operator. For simplicity, therefore, I 
                                                          
11 Things are actually more complicated due to the contrast between 'ought' and 'must', the latter being 
intuitively stronger. Chrisman suggests that the ordering source might have two tiers of propositions, 
those which are 'necessitated' relative to an ideal (must) and those 'expected' (ought). I ignore this 
complication here. See Chrisman (2015: 90-6) for discussion. 
12 c.f. Schroeder's account of propositions as things we can do (§2.2). 
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will assume for the remainder of this chapter that (5) provides the correct semantics for 
'ought', 
 
3.2.2 Metasemantics for 'Ought' 
 
Chrisman believes that the task of metasemantic is to provide general grounding 
explanations of the results of semantics in terms of more fundamental nonsemantic 
properties and facts (2015: 15). If we take (5) to specify the meaning of 'ought', then what 
we are after is an explanation of that in virtue of which (5) is true of 'ought'. I will 
henceforth use 'metasemantics' to refer exclusively to this sense of the term.  
The relevant grounding base for semantics consists of the psychological, sociological, 
and ontological facts to do with the actual and possible linguistically meaningful use of 
phonemes and graphemes (2015: 14). Very generally, we can distinguish between three 
types of use that might be thought to ground meaning:  
 
Representationalists treat the use of language to talk about reality as fundamental. So in the 
final analysis, they see something like asymmetric dependency or functional relations 
between language and extralinguistic reality as generating meanings. Ideationalists, by 
contrast, take the use of language to express our minds or thoughts as fundamental. So in the 
final analysis, they see the expression of ideas as conferring meanings to arbitrary sounds and 
scribbles, thereby making them part of a language. Finally, inferentialists take the 
semantically fundamental use of language to be making moves in an inferentially structured 
practice; for example, to commit to some claim that can provide reasons for other 
commitments and can itself stand in need of inferential legitimization. So in the final analysis, 
they see inferentially articulated commitments as the fundamental level of explanation of how 
and why our language has the semantic structure it has. (Chrisman 2015: 16)13 
 
These views need not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, they can be understood either as 
global claims about all language, or local claims about some language fragment. As 
Chrisman sees it, metaethical descriptivism is broadly aligned with representationalism, 
and expressivism with ideationalism. As Chrisman argues for an inferentialist version of 
nondescriptivism, I will for the most part ignore expressivism and ideationalism in this 
chapter. 
On this view, descriptivism about 'ought' (roughly) comes to the claim that the truth 
of (5) is grounded in how we use 'ought' to represent ways that reality could be (2015: 
161). While this notion is left somewhat vague (presumably to allow for different ways 
of spelling out the view), I take it as essential to Chrisman that this is an ontologically 
committing notion of representation. By ontologically committing, I do not mean that 
representationalism is itself an ontological thesis. Rather, representational uses of 
language function to describe some way that ontological reality is or might be. It is then 
                                                          
13 Chrisman does not consider the view that the semantic facts might be fundamental and have no 
grounds―c.f. Boghossian (1989). I ignore this complication here, though see §3.5.2 and Chapter 1: n.12. 
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another question whether reality is as the language represents it as being. So by using 
ethical language representationally, we describe moral properties, relations and states of 
affairs, whether or not these in fact exist. I will henceforth use the qualifier 'robust' to 
mean ontologically committing in this sense. 
Intuitively, this draws the boundary in roughly the right place. Recall that one of the 
general motivations behind nondescriptivism encountered in the first chapter was to 
avoid any commitment to a metaphysics of morality without thereby attributing some 
kind of systematic error to all of our moral judgments. A natural thought would then be 
to define nondescriptivism as the negation of representationalism. As we will see in the 
next section, there are problems with this suggestion. However, for the moment let's 
assume that this suggestion is on the right lines. 
Not only does Chrisman think that there are general reasons to be sceptical of 
attempts to incorporate moral properties and states of affairs into our overall ontology. 
He also argues that his semantics for 'ought' provide a particular difficulty for 
representationalism. If (5) is true of 'ought' in virtue of how we use the term to represent 
reality as being, what ontological commitments do we incur by making ought-claims or 
judgments? 
 
According to the [representationalist] view, the truth-conditions of ought-sentences should be 
interpreted as representing a complex way reality could be, which includes things like the 
truth of a proposition relative to possible worlds and the legitimacy of practitions relative to 
possible norms. This involves ontological commitment to the existence of such possible 
worlds and possible norms; and obviously that commitment coheres with the realist view in 
metanormative theory that things like values, obligations, and norms are part of the 
fundamental fabric of reality. (2015: 167) 
 
Chrisman argues this position is an "ontologically prolifigate position, in the sense that 
it is an affront to common sense about the difference between what is real and what is 
imaginary/virtual/fictional." (2015: 170) Chrisman takes this to follow from a 
commitment to the existence of (nonactual) possible worlds. One is reminded here of the 
'incredulous stare' objection to modal realism. The problem, however, is that a 
commitment to the existence of possible worlds does not imply a commitment to modal 
realism. For example, possible worlds might be identified with sets of propositions or 
sentences. Existence to these kinds of entities are hardly ontologically proliferate. 
Moreover, Chrisman seems to suggest that a commitment to the existence of possible 
worlds implies a commitment to the existence of the contents of those possible worlds, 
such as "dragons"―hence (presumably) the "affront to common sense". However, this 
simply does not follow on ersatz views of possible worlds.14 
                                                          
14 It should be noted that Chrisman does acknowledge this objection, though he offers no reply to it 
(2015: 169n). Perhaps one might argue that the ontological conservativeness of nondescriptivism at 
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Chrisman also argues that nondescriptivism is supported by the semantic function of 
'ought'. He notes how in truth-conditional semantics, 'ought', like the logical operators 
more generally, gets a different treatment than other kinds of terms, such as predicates 
and indexicals. One might argue that 'ought' therefore does something fundamentally 
different in language than representing (2015: 169). However, this seems like an odd 
argument for Chrisman to make. The whole point of distinguishing semantics from 
metasemantics was to isolate the inquiry into the logico-semantic properties of 
expressions from broader philosophical debates about what such language 
fundamentally does or is fundamentally about. However, Chrisman seems to be doing 
here exactly what he says we should not do, viz., inferring metasemantic conclusions 
directly from semantic premises. However, perhaps only the weaker point is being 
made that it is less obvious that sentential operators are used to represent compared 
with predicates. 
There is also a question as to what we are to say about other moral terms, which are 
not obviously parsed as modals. Chrisman does make some suggestions as to how one 
might analyse other notions in terms of ought and then take ought as fundamental 
(2015: 209-14). It would take us too far afield to examine these here. I will note, however, 
the burden that this seems to place on arguing for moral nondescriptivism generally. 
Chrisman sometimes remarks that, in the worst case, nondescriptivism could still be 
argued for 'ought', even if not for other moral terms. However, this also relies on his 
earlier arguments against analysing ought in terms of other normative notions. So there 
is a worry that the final position might be incredibly weak. 
These problems notwithstanding, one might argue that Chrisman's arguments have 
bite insofar as there is an attractive nonrepresentational alternative, which of course he 
thinks there is. So let us turn to that now. Metasemantic inferentialism is the idea that 
the contents of sentences are grounded in our inferential practices. Thus stated, it 
implies neither descriptivism nor nondescriptivism. It all depends on the nature of the 
inferential practices in question. Theses practices might be articulated in terms of an 
inferential commitment to (robustly) representing reality as being a certain way. So not 
just any inferential practice will do for the nondescriptivist. 
Fortunately, a nonrepresentational theory of inferential practice is ready to hand in 
Robert Brandom's (1994, 2000, 2008) Sellarsian socio-normative theory of discursive 
practice. Chrisman presents a variant on this account in which to situate a 
nondescriptivist metasemantics for 'ought'. While Brandom's inferentialism is often 
presented as an alternative to truth-conditional semantics (meaning as use), Chrisman 
                                                                                                                                                                    
least is a pro tanto reason for favouring it. Regardless, this has nothing specific to do with 'ought' being 
a modal operator. 
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argues that we are better to construe it as a metasemantic account of the kind of 
linguistic practice that grounds the contents of linguistic expressions.15,16  
The basic idea is that meaningful sentences have the content they do in virtue of how 
we use those sentences in a social-normative discursive practice ('the game of giving 
and asking for reasons'). By using a sentence to make an assertion, one makes a 
commitment that can both serve as a reason or justification for other commitments by 
way of a premise, or itself stand in need of justification by way of a conclusion: 
 
the sense of endorsement that determines the force of assertional speech acts involves, at a 
minimum, a kind of commitment the speaker's entitlement to which is always potentially at 
issue. The assertible contents expressed by declarative sentences whose utterance can have 
this sort of force must accordingly be inferentially articulated along both normative 
dimensions. Downstream, they must have inferential consequences, commitment to which is 
entailed by commitment to the original content. Upstream, they must have inferential 
antecedents, relations to the contents that can serve as premises from which entitlement to the 
original content can be inherited. (Brandom 2000: 193-4) 
 
The relevant kind of inferential relations are understood primarily as semantic or 
'material' implications, rather than logical entailments. So, for example, the propriety of 
the inference from 'Pittsburgh is to the west of Princeton' to 'Princeton is to the east of 
Pittsburgh' fundamentally follows from the content of the claims, particularly the 
meaning of 'west' and 'east', rather than from a logical deduction. The suggestion is that 
all meaning is determined by these sorts of inferences.  
What kind of inferentially articulated commitment does one acknowledge when one 
makes an 'ought' claim? Brandom argues that both modal and normative vocabulary 
should be understood as broadly logical vocabulary. What kind of commitment does 
one acknowledge when one makes a claim using logical terms? Brandom argues that 
our use of logical vocabulary is fundamentally expressive rather than descriptive. 
However, this is a different sense of 'expressive' than that of the kind discussed in 
previous chapters. For Brandom, logic is expressive in the sense that it makes explicit or 
codifies certain aspects of the inferential structure of our discursive practice. The 
paradigm example is given by the conditional: 
 
Prior to the introduction of such a conditional locution, one could do something, one could 
treat a judgment as having a certain content (implicitly attribute that content to it) by 
                                                          
15 Brandom often flounders on whether his inferentialism is incompatible with truth-conditional  
semantics―see Price (2011a) for discussion. Price also argues that we should construe Brandom's 
theory as a 'sideways-on' explanation of meaning, rather than an account of meaning itself. 
16 Brandom (1994) distinguishes 'normative pragmatics', which seems to provide something similar to a 
metasemantic explanation in Chrisman's sense, from 'inferential semantics', which seems to be about 
the nature content itself and not just its determination. Chrisman helps himself to both aspects in his 
metasemantics, but it is not obvious he is entitled to the latter part of Brandom's account. The next 
section will address these worries more generally. 
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endorsing various inferences involving it and rejecting others. After conditional locutions 
have been introduced, one can say, as part of the content of a claim (something that can serve 
as a premise and conclusion in inference), that a certain inference is acceptable. One is able to 
make explicit material inferential relations between an antecedent or premise and a 
consequent or conclusion. Since, according to the inferentialist view of conceptual contents, it 
is these implicitly recognized material inferential relations that conceptual contents consist in, 
the conditional permits such contents to be explicitly expressed. (Brandom 2000: 60) 
 
By making explicit the otherwise implicit inferential relations that determine 
propositional content, the inferences can themselves become the subject of assertion and 
judgment, thereby standing in potential need of justification. 
Importantly for our purposes, this is a thoroughly nondescriptive account of how 
logical content is determined. No representational notions come into the account at all. 
Logical content is explained in terms other than describing some aspect of reality (the 
logical part). So we need not appeal to logical properties or facts in the fundamental 
explanation of logical content. Rather, logical vocabulary is fundamentally used to 
articulate the conceptual or inferential framework in which all other meaningful 
language use occurs. 
In an analogous way, Chrisman urges that we should understand the fundamental 
content-determining role of 'ought' as codifying or making explicit 'second-order' 
inferential relations between more basic items of content. However, in the moral case, 
the kind of inferential relations made explicit are those to do with practical reasoning. As 
Brandom puts it, "normative vocabulary (including expressions of preference) makes 
explicit the endorsement (attributed or acknowledged) of material proprieties of practical 
reasoning. Normative vocabulary plays the same expressive role on the practical side 
that conditionals do on the theoretical side." (2000: 89) So, for example, perhaps the claim: 
 
(7) We ought to give more to charity, 
 
makes explicit material inferences such as: 
 
(8) There is suffering in the world which we can alleviate by giving to charity at no 
unreasonable cost to us  We shall give to charity. 
 
However, as (7) is itself a propositional claim, it not only makes explicit inferential 
relations such as (8), but it can also serve as a commitment whose entitlement can be 
called into question.17 So, for example, one might justify (7) with: 
 
(9) We ought to alleviate suffering in the world if it is at no unreasonable cost to us. 
                                                          
17 Thus ought-claims are not "mere "inference tickets" in a "game" of giving and asking for reasons" 
(Chrisman 2015: 194), as they themselves express a propositional content. 
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To conclude, we have the beginnings sketched of a metasemantic inferentialism for 
'ought'. As the linguistic practice that grounds the semantics for 'ought' does not involve 
any robustly representational notions, the account is nondescriptivist. Moreover, as 
'ought' was characterised as a "metaconceptual device" for "manipulating more basic 
items of content", this gives us a natural place to draw the descriptive/nondescriptive 
boundary in language use. For the more basic items of content can be understood as 
descriptive contents, which keep track of things in our environment, rather than directly 
regulating our discursive practices. One might cash out descriptive commitments in 
terms of the inferential commitment to reality being a certain way (2015: 191-2), or one 
could be a local inferentialist about moral vocabulary and a local representationalist 
about descriptive vocabulary (2015: 170-1). Either way, we have a clear contrast between 
language use that is ontologically committing (descriptive) and language use that is not 
ontologically committing (nondescriptive). 
 
3.3 Nondescriptivism Lost: A Problem With Grounding 
 
Although it has not been the topic of discussion in this chapter, inferentialism looks in 
certain ways more promising than expressivism as a form of nondescriptivism. Seeing 
as the content of a sentence is determined by its inferential role rather than by the 
mental state expressed by canonical uses of the sentence, it is not obvious that the Frege-
Geach problem arises for inferentialism. In the same way that expressivism explains 
motivational internalism by including directive mental states in its fundamental 
characterisation, inferentialism explains moral reasoning by specifying the inferential 
role of moral terms in its fundamental characterisation. 
There are other respects, however, in which one might think that inferentialism 
comes at a cost. One reason has to do with the holistic nature of content or content 
determination under inferentialism. Chrisman only suggests a few illustrative examples 
of the kind of inferences that ground the content of expressions. While this may enable 
us to get the general picture, one might worry that the account is left rather vague and 
imprecise. The question is to determine the scope of implication relations that determine 
the meaning of 'ought'. There are innumerable inferences that one might make using 
such term. Surely not all of these are of equal importance in determining the meaning of 
the term. This is in fact a problem for inferentialism generally. Chrisman acknowledges 
the general worry, but provides no answer (2015: 188-9).  
Not only is there a question of scope, however, but there also seems to be a lack of 
systematicity to the kind of inferences that 'ought' codifies. Metasemantics is ultimately 
about our linguistic behaviour, and so we aren't in the business of providing necessary 
and sufficient constitutive conditions for ought-claims. However, we might still wish to 
provide necessary and sufficient conditions, perhaps constitutive, for making ought-
claims, perhaps in terms of the rules that it is necessary and sufficient to follow in order 
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to make ought-assessments.18 However, if inferentialism is correct, then there's a real 
question of how much we can expect in this way. If content is radically holistic in the 
way that Brandom seems to think, then there might simply be no systematic and precise 
account of the inferences that determine the content of 'ought', or any other expression 
for that matter. Perhaps we can only give the general metasemantic function together 
with canonical examples. This is in contrast to expressivism which takes a more atomic 
approach to explaining the meaning of expressions. 
It is probably worth noting also that it is not without controversy that a Brandomian 
inferentialism has the resources to deal with subsentential compositionality. The basic 
item of content for Brandom must be a proposition, as asserting a sentence is the 
simplest move that one can make in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Nothing 
can be said except with a proposition. Very roughly, Brandom accounts for the 
compositionality of subsentential expressions in terms of the inferential proprieties of 
the substitution of such expressions across a certain class of sentences. It is not the place 
to get into such matters here, but it is interesting that Chrisman does not so much as 
mention the issue, considering his emphasis on compositionality generally.19  Perhaps 
he thinks that these issues simply don't arise at the level of metasemantics. Or perhaps 
as 'ought' is a sentential operator, predicates can be rescued by a local 
representationalism. In any case, something needs to be said here. 
So there are a number of issues that need clearing up if one were to follow 
Chrisman's line. However, I think that these are more invitations for clarification and 
development rather than knock-down objections. In any case, there is a more 
fundamental problem with Chrisman's account: metasemantic nondescriptivism does 
not imply metaethical nondescriptivism.  
Define descriptivism for language L the claim that L is robustly representational in 
the ontologically committing sense. Define nondescriptivism about L as the negation of 
descriptivism about L. Suppose Chrisman's semantics and metasemantics for 'ought' are 
both true. So the metasemantics for 'ought' are nondescriptive in the defined sense. This 
is perfectly consistent, however, with supposing that the semantics for 'ought' are 
descriptive in the defined sense. It was claimed that (5) itself does not imply 
descriptivism. But it does not it rule out either. So while the metasemantics for 'ought' 
might be nondescriptive, the semantics for ought might still be descriptive, because the 
content itself is robustly representational. However, if the content of 'ought' is robustly 
representational, then this fails to meet the criteria of adequacy for nondescriptivism. So 
Chrisman's metasemantic theory does not constitute metaethical nondescriptivism.  
In fact, any metasemantics will fail to secure metaethical nondescriptivism in the 
absence of auxiliary claims. It has nothing much to do with inferentialism, but rather 
with how the traditional metaethical debate has been relocated to the level of 
                                                          
18 This kind of approach is carried out, for example, by Zalabardo (ms) for alethic assessment. 
19 Fodor and Lepore (2001a, 2007) particularly press this point against Brandom, who replies in (2010b). 
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metasemantics. Once we observe that a nondescriptive metasemantics is compatible 
with a robustly descriptive semantics, however, it begins to look less like a relocation 
and more like a change of topic. Perhaps one could incorporate one's metasemantic 
theory into one's overall metaethical theory. Moreover, perhaps it might play an 
important role in explaining how moral discourse is nondescriptive, if indeed it is. But it 
cannot explain this by itself. We need an additional account of how the content itself is 
nondescriptive.  
To make the point a little more concrete, consider the conceptual role semantics for 
'ought' set out by Wedgwood (2007). Like Chrisman, Wedgwood claims that "the 
essential conceptual role of normative concepts consists of a certain regulative role that 
these concepts play in reasoning―including practical reasoning. In that sense, normative 
judgments about what actions one ought to perform are essentially connected to 
motivation and practical reasoning because they involve a concept whose essential 
conceptual role is its role in practical reasoning." (2007: 80) Also like Chrisman, 
Wedgwood takes 'ought' to be a propositional operator, though now indexed to agent 
and time parameters. The conceptual role of ought is then given in terms of how one 
who accepts an ought-claim is thereby committed to make the prejacent proposition 
part of one's ideal plans about what to do at the specified time (2007: 97). This glosses 
over many important details. However, both accounts maintain that the role of 'ought' 
in reasoning fundamentally determines its semantic content.  
Wedgwood differs from Chrisman in assuming that the conceptual role of 'ought' 
determines a robustly representational content for 'ought'. This is largely due to 
semantic assumptions held by Wedgwood that Chrisman would reject. Particularly, 
Wedgwood assumes that "the nature of a concept consists purely in the contribution 
that it makes to the nature of the thoughts in which it appears; and such thoughts are 
nothing more than ways of representing some possible state of affairs." (2007: 81) The 
semantic value of 'ought' is given as the state of affairs that would make all the rules of 
inference that constitute the conceptual role of 'ought' valid (2007: 86). Particularly: 
  
the semantic value of the practical 'ought'-operator 'O<A,t>(p)' will be the weakest property of a 
proposition p that makes it the case that it is correct for A to make the proposition p part of her 
ideal plan about what to do at t, and incorrect for A to make the negation of p a part of her 
ideal plan. (2007: 100)  
 
Of course, Chrisman would reject Wedgwood's assumption that one needs to posit any 
such state of affairs to play the role of the semantic value of 'ought' given Wedgwood's 
compositional semantics. However, this is beside the point. For the present objection to 
Chrisman's account to go through, it is sufficient that Wedgwood's account is a 
possibility.  
Importantly for our purposes, the functional role that determines the 
representational content of 'ought' for Wedgwood can be given without any mention of 
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representational notions. All that is required is acceptance, commitment, and ideal 
planning.20 We might say that Wedgwood provides a nondescriptive metasemantics for 
'ought', and that this only determines a robustly descriptive semantics for 'ought' given 
other substantive assumptions. Perhaps Wedgwood would not agree to putting it in this 
way, but his account could easily be adapted. Regardless, we have here a 
counterexample to the idea that a nondescriptive metasemantics for moral language 
implies metaethical nondescriptivism.21 
The trouble stems from a confusion on Chrisman's part regarding his 'semantic 
conservativism'.22 Semantic conservativism is the idea already encountered that one 
should be able to engage in compositional semantics using model-theoretic tools (or 
whatever else) without getting embroiled in metaphysical debate.23 Here, the use of the 
particular semantic notions is justified insofar as they perspicuously model the semantic 
properties under consideration. However, once we have decided on our semantics in 
this metaphysically neutral way, we do need to get embroiled in metaphysical debate to 
settle the descriptivism/nondescriptivism question. This is a question about the nature of 
moral language. In addition to grounding explanations of one's semantics, one can ask 
for constitutive explanations of one's semantics. By engaging in a metaphysically neutral 
semantics and then going on to provide metasemantic grounding explanations, we skip 
pass constitutive explanations of what it is for an expression to have the meaning that it 
does. 
Notwithstanding express statements that metasemantics is in the business of 
providing grounding explanations, Chrisman often shifts to the language of constitutive 
explanation in his discussion of metasemantics. For example, there is talk of "truth-
conditions as ways reality can be", and "truth-conditions as positions in a space of 
implications" (2015: 161, 184 emphasis added). Moreover, in motivating his semantic 
conservativism, he makes the following remark: "I am skeptical that anyone who rejects 
descriptivism must reject the standard truth-conditionalist approach to compositional 
semantics... because I think one can take a less committal view about what constitutes 
truth in "truth-conditions"" (Chrisman 2015: 9, emphasis added). So while the official 
line is that Chrisman's metaethical nondescriptivism is a metasemantic view, it is 
unclear where he stands on the constitutive question. 
What is clear, I submit, is that grounding alone cannot secure metaethical 
nondescriptivism. A full blown metaethical theory of language cannot remain silent on 
                                                          
20 While 'acceptance' for Wedgwood is belief in a robustly representational sense, this is a consequence 
of 'ought' being robustly representational rather than being an essential feature of the conceptual role 
as such.  
21 Perhaps other aspects of Wedgwood's view would rule him out as a counterexample, such as his 
Platonism about normativity. This example is only meant to be illustrative, however, and so the main 
point would remain unaffected. A quite different sort of counterexample might come from the kind of 
Aristotelian realism associated with Wiggins and McDowell. 
22 The phrase is from Bar-On, Chrisman, and Sias (2014). 
23 §3.1. 
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the nature of the content of 'ought', or what it is for 'ought' to have the content that it 
does. Supplementary theory is needed. However, remaining silent is not the same as 
claiming that there is not much to say. In the final section of this chapter, I suggest how 
an inferentialist metasemantics might be combined with a deflationary theory of content 
to achieve metaethical nondescriptivism. His use of constitutive language 
notwithstanding, one might think that this is implicit in his account anyway, and 
elsewhere he comes close to endorsing some kind of semantic deflationism.24 After 
motivating the position, I discuss some of the tensions that might arise from combining 
deflationism and nondescriptivism. 
 
3.5 Nondescriptivism Regained: Semantic Deflationism 
 
3.5.1 A Way Ahead? 
 
Nondescriptivist grounds for some semantics do not imply constitutive 
nondescriptivism about those semantics. To save Chrisman's account, we therefore need 
a suitably nondescriptive answer to the constitutive question. There are two ways to go 
here. On the one hand, one might provide an inferentialist account of what content 
consist in―that truth conditions just are positions within a space of implications. 
Alternatively, one might provide a deflationist or minimalist answer to the constitutive 
question―that there is no deeper answer to what truth conditions consist in, generally 
speaking. As noted above, I don't think it's entirely clear from Chrisman's own writing 
which, if any, he would opt for. However, it seems to me that a deflationary approach is 
better suited to provide for his wider theoretical aims. Let me briefly explain why. 
As well as arguing for his particular version of nondescriptivism, Chrisman wants to 
convince us more generally that debates between descriptivists and nondescriptivists 
should be conducted at the level of metasemantics and not semantics. By focusing on 
compositionality and truth-conditions, we obscure the debate, as the standard resources 
to deal with these features of language form a common treasury for all. If descriptivism 
or nondescriptivism are grounding explanations, then the troublesome semantic 
constraints do not directly apply, as these only apply to semantic theory. However, if 
either view were formulated instead as a constitutive explanation, then the semantic 
constraints would directly apply. Whereas grounding explanations invoke some class of 
facts in the explanans distinct from the semantic facts, constitutive explanations tell us 
about the identity conditions of the explanandum. As such, the explanandum and the 
explanans pick out the same class of facts. Ipso facto, any constraints that apply to one's 
                                                          
24 Chrisman (2014). Again, however, it's not fully clear whether he endorses the approach himself.  
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compositional semantics apply directly to one's account of what one's semantics consist 
in.25 
Chrisman argues by interpreting expressivism in terms of an ideationalist 
metasemantics, expressivists can embrace truth-conditional semantics and thereby 
"deploy the standard truth-conditionalist explanations of semantic phenomena that 
critics accuse them of being unable to explain." (2015: 172) If this kind of ideationalism is 
a grounding claim, then this leaves room for a constitutive descriptivist construal of 
moral sentences, and so fails to secure nondescriptivism. If we understand ideationalism 
as a constitutive explanation, however, then one's truth-conditional semantics just is a 
psychologistic-expressivist semantics. And so all the problems that arise for semantic 
versions of expressivism will also arise for one's truth-conditional semantics, if what the 
truth-conditions consist in are just correctness conditions of the thought one should 
have when uttering certain sentences.26 
This need not be taken as an argument against any such view. For example, one 
could first provide a truth-conditional model for moral expressions and then go on to 
interpret the elements of the model in psychologistic terms. This would allow one to see 
exactly the kind of structure required of the mental states that we use such expressions 
to express. Something like this is argued by Alex Silk (2015), who develops a possible 
worlds semantics for deontic normative claims, where normative sentences are 
evaluated relative to a set of ranked possible worlds. Logical relations in this model are 
then argued to be isomorphic to coherence constraints on the kind of preference 
attitudes appealed to in decision theory. So there is scope for nondescriptivism to make 
use of truth-conditional semantics without the move to metasemantics.  
In essence, however, such an approach does not avoid the hard toil of providing an 
nondescriptivist alternative to truth-conditional semantics. At best, it has the 
methodological benefit of allowing us to get clear on the exact structure of whatever 
answers the constitutive question. This is at odds with Chrisman's general picture for 
two reasons. First, Chrisman clearly has something stronger than this in mind. He 
clearly thinks, for example, that the Frege-Geach problem (in its semantic guises) isn't 
really a problem for expressivism, which it would be on this model. Second, if one did 
manage to successfully provide (say) an inferentialist constitutive explanation, then it is 
unclear what explanatory work the grounding explanation is left to do. Perhaps the 
grounding explanation might help to explain the constitutive explanation in some way. 
However, if we asked in virtue of what our account of moral language was 
                                                          
25 One might deny that compositionality does in fact impose any serious constraints―see Horwich 
(1998a: ch.7), and Fodor and Lepore (2001b) and Horwich (2005: ch.8) for discussion. 
26 Chrisman does acknowledge that the Frege-Geach problem might remain a problem for a 
metasemantic expressivism due to difficulties specifying the kind of mental state expressed by mixed 
sentences (2015: 177-80). The argument being presented here, however, is much stronger: any problem 
that arises for an expressivist semantics will arise for a truth-conditional semantics with an 
expressivist-constitutive explanation. 
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nondescriptivist, it would seem sufficient simply to cite the nondescriptive constitutive 
explanation.27 I think these reasons undermine Chrisman's overarching aims, and so I 
suggest that he should reject this approach, and instead opt for semantic deflationism. 
What is semantic deflationism? Recall that we can roughly distinguish a demand to 
specify what the meaning of some expression e is from a demand to explain what e's 
having this meaning consists in. According to the deflationist, there simply is no answer 
to the second question. Or rather, there is no answer to the second question over and 
above the first. In other words, it is sufficient to specify what the meaning of an 
expression consists in simply by specifying the meaning of the expression. While 
semantic notions, particularly truth, may be used to express the specification of the 
meaning of an expression, truth itself does not consist in any substantive or robust 
word-world relation. Rather, there is nothing more to say about truth over and above 
the trivial platitudes governing our use of the truth-predicate. 
There are many ways in which to develop this thought. It is not the place to survey 
these here. For simplicity, I will focus on the semantic deflationism expounded by Paul 
Horwich (1998a, 1998b). According to Horwich, our use of the truth-predicate can be 
explained solely by the fact that we are inclined to accept instances of the following 
equivalence schema: 
 
(ES) The proposition that p is true iff p. 
 
Moreover, our acceptance of (ES) is both necessary and sufficient to explain the reason 
for having a truth-predicate in the first place―viz., the role that it plays in 
generalisations, whether in logic, ordinary language, philosophy, or semantics (Horwich 
1998a: 106). These generalisations are achieved by virtue of the logical relations that they 
stand in to (ES). Consider the claim made in ordinary language: 
 
(10) What Oscar said was true. 
 
Imagine that we think that Oscar has great culinary taste, and what Oscar asserted was 
that eels are good (1998b: 3). However, we didn't quite catch his remark. If we wish to 
infer what it is that Oscar said, then we need a proposition equivalent to: 
 
(11) If what Oscar said is that eels are good then eels are good, and if he said that milk 
is white then milk is white, ... and so on. 
 
And it is exactly (10) that supplies this. Consider next the case from logic: 
 
                                                          
27 Assuming that one wouldn't hold a nondescriptive constitutive explanation together with a 
descriptive grounding explanation. That would just be weird. 
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(12) Every proposition of the form everything is F or not F is true.  
 
Without the truth-predicate, we would have great difficulty expressing (13), other than 
by asserting an infinite conjunction of every proposition of that form (1998b: 4). This 
expressive role exhausts the reason for having a truth-predicate in a language.28 Other 
basic semantic notions can be explained in a similar fashion.29 The idea is that by 
'deflating' semantics in this way, the truths of semantics do not commit us to some 
robustly real domain of facts that such facts must be identified with.30  
Is semantic deflationism open to the objection that a nondescriptive account of the 
use that determines some content does not rule out a robustly descriptive constitutive 
account of that content? This is a delicate issue which requires more attention than I can 
give it here. The objection is right to say that there is nothing in the deflationist's account 
of our use of, say, the truth-predicate, that strictly rules out the possibility that there 
might be some substantive property of truth. After all, the theory says nothing positive 
about truth at all (other than trivial platitudes such as (ES)). It is not better to call 
deflationism a theory of the truth-predicate or of truth ascriptions?31 
Well, yes and no. Deflationism aims to undermine any motivation for inflating truth 
in the first place. Why, it asks, do we need to seek some metaphysically substantive 
notion if our use of the notion can be explained perfectly well without it? Note that this 
move is in essence the same as the nondescriptivist argument for metaphysical and 
epistemological solvency.32 If we explain the concept in question in terms of its 
nondescriptive practical function, we can sidestep the need for any metaphysical or 
epistemological account of the domain of the concept in question, even if we do not rule 
out the possibility of providing one. However, it still might be argued that the perceived 
need to provide one is based on a misunderstanding of the concept in question. So it is 
still perfectly in order to talk about semantics truths. But we need to take a quietist 
approach to what these truths consist in. Or so the deflationist argues. 
I don't take myself to have shown that this move is sound. Of course, semantic 
deflationism itself would need to be defended. I suggest this, however, in order to 
sketch a picture of what a deflationary conception of semantics might look like. If ought 
sentences express propositions, and propositions are given in terms of truth-conditions, 
then there is nothing to say about the truth-conditions of ought-claims other than what 
is stated by our semantics. This is to take a quietist approach to propositional content, 
                                                          
28 This is not to say that we might use the truth-predicate pragmatically for many other purposes―see 
Kukla and Winsburg (2015: 27). 
29 For example, see Horwich (1998: ch4, ch5) for 'meaning' and 'reference' respectively. 
30 For arguments that semantic deflationism is compatible with truth-conditional semantics, see, for 
example, Burgess (2011) and Williams (1999). 
31 Devitt is fond of making this point (2010). 
32 §1.1. 
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where no constitutive question arises (even if it is not strictly ruled out).33 So there is no 
deep answer as to what the meaning of 'ought' consists in. We can still take (5) to 
provide a representation of how 'ought' compositionally relates to other expressions. 
Moreover, it might have other uses, such as in translation, for it provides necessary and 
sufficient conditions for recognising 'ought' in an alien language. However, as truth 
conditions as such do not have any deep nature, there is no need to understand (5) as 
having any deep nature either. While (5) may have many explanatory uses, it says 
nothing deeper than 'ought' means ought. 
However, the question naturally arises as to why (5) is true of 'ought' and not some 
other semantic rule? Why does 'ought', or any term for that matter, mean anything at 
all? If (5) is an irreducible semantic fact, then how as natural beings are we meant to 
grasp a rule like (5)? Semantic deflationism provides no answers to these questions. 
Moreover, there is a worry that the account begins to look mysterious, appealing to an 
unexplained realm of non-natural semantic facts. If this is left unexplained, then this 
goes against one of our criteria of adequacy for naturalism.34 Moreover, principles like 
(ES) use the notion of a proposition, and so seem to require an antecedent 
understanding of a meaningful content to which semantic notions can be applied to in 
the first place. 
It is at this point that we can appeal to Chrisman's inferentialism to answer these 
questions. In Chrisman's case, sentences are meaningful in virtue of how they can be 
used to acknowledge commitments that can stand in need of justification and serve as a 
reasons within a discursive social practice of deontic scorekeeping. 'Ought' is therefore a 
meaningful term because it can be used in inferential practice this way. It has the 
particular meaning that it does because of the particular inferential role that it plays, 
namely its being used to make explicit the propriety of particular kinds of material 
inference (moral practical reasoning).35 
Thus, by adopting a deflationary attitude to semantic content, we shift the 
explanatory burden of one's theory of moral language to the level of metasemantics. So 
could semantic deflationism save Chrisman's account? It certainly doesn't save his more 
general claim that metaethics generally is better thought of in metasemantics terms. 
Semantic deflationism is a substantive and controversial commitment, so it should not 
have to underlie any general debate. However, this does not mean that it is not an 
option for any particular theory. So we might still hope to save metasemantic 
nondescriptivism by embracing semantic deflationism. Most contemporary 
nondescriptivists accept some sort of deflationism about truth anyway, and so it is not a 
huge step to the more radical sort of deflationism sketched above.  
                                                          
33 Thus the kind of deflationism presented here is not helpfully presented as some kind of anti-realism 
about content―c.f. Boghossian (1990).  
34 §1.3. 
35 Having a suitable metasemantic would also preclude the introduction of deviant expressions such as 
Dreier's 'is hiyo'-predicate (1996).  
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Obviously, however, the approach is theoretically more costly, as a fully worked out 
theory would need to defend not only metaethical nondescriptivism but also semantic 
deflationism. However, nondescriptivism just is philosophy of language applied to 
moral discourse, and so we should expect commitments from each to entitle and stand 
in need of justification to commitments from the other. Moreover, semantic 
deflationism, while raising distinctive problems of its own, is attractive for many of the 
same reasons that nondescriptivism is. These two approaches are to a large degree 
complementary. In the remainder of this chapter, I raise some problems that arise from 
holding these views jointly. 
 
3.5.2 Troubles in Paradise 
 
Nondescriptivism often starts with the thought that moral discourse is in some sense 
importantly different to descriptive discourse, paradigmatically perceptual discourse. 
One might worry, however, that semantic deflationism threatens to undermine this 
distinction. For it might be thought that by deflating what are traditionally considered 
to be 'representational' semantic notions, such as truth and reference, we thereby rob the 
descriptivist of the resources to formulate her position. This in turn would rob the 
nondescriptivist of the resources to formulate the distinction between descriptive and 
nondescriptive discourse that motivated her theory in the first place. 
Thus stated, I hope it is clear that the worry is mistaken. It is true that semantic 
deflationism denies that there is any distinction to be drawn between descriptive and 
nondescriptive discourse at the level of semantics. However, it does not follow that 
there distinction cannot be made in other ways―particularly, in one's metasemantics. So 
we can still use representational concepts in our metasemantic account of descriptive 
discourse. They will just be nonsemantic. In fact, this has to be the case anyway, 
regardless of semantic deflationism. For if one provides a representationalist 
metasemantics, and metasemantics is in the business of explaining semantics in terms of 
more fundamental nonsemantic facts, then we need some nonsemantic conception of 
representation anyway. The general idea should be familiar from 'theories of reference' 
that aim to reduce reference to some naturalistic relation.36 So perhaps these theories 
could provide the conceptual resources for formulating descriptivism. 
This only goes so far, however, and certain tensions remain. At this level of 
abstraction, the move might look somewhat ad hoc. For it might seem that we 
maintained the descriptive/nondescriptive distinction by fiat, stipulating two distinct 
senses in which a term can 'refer', for example. I think that the tension here is real, and I 
                                                          
36 Chrisman suggests in passing that representation might be cashed out in terms of causal regulation 
(2015: 192). See, for example, Field (1972), Millikan (1984), and Fodor (1990) for three quite different 
conceptions of the kind of causal relation this might be. Chrisman's notion of descriptivism as 
representing ways that reality might also be thought to lend itself to Lewis' 'reference magnetism' 
(1984). 
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do not intend to settle the issue here. It certainly looks ad hoc when presented at this 
level of generality. However, perhaps it will not when we have a worked out theory of 
what each sense means. After all, substantive representational notions in philosophy are 
terms of art, even if their life begins in the everyday. So it would be premature to try 
and settle the matter here. 
Notice that the same issue arises in relation to the corresponding ontological 
categories. We saw that one way in which Chrisman seems to distinguish between 
descriptive and nondescriptive uses of language is between those that are ontologically 
committing (e.g. property denoting) and those that are not. Again, ontological 
naturalism―the thesis that all that exists are the objects, properties, and states of affairs 
recognised by the natural sciences―is often cited as a motivation for nondescriptivism. 
Demarcation problems aside, semantic deflationism about semantic categories invites a 
corresponding deflationism about ontological categories. For example, insofar as we 
accept a predicate 'F', and we accept the claim that 'x is F', then it seems a harmless step 
to infer that x has the property of being F. This is an example of what Stephen Schiffer 
(2003) calls a 'something-from-nothing-transformation': a conceptually valid inference 
from a statement involving a certain kind of semantic category to a statement that refers 
to a 'pleonastic' entity corresponding to that category.37   
Again, perhaps a working distinction could be made.38 However, it must be 
principled and explanatory. It is no good simply postulating a bifurcation between those 
expressions that are "really" representational and those that are not. While some writers 
have urged that we should give up on representation entirely in theorising about 
language, this seems premature if drawn from very general considerations about 
semantic deflationism.39 One might think that Chrisman has a way out here. For recall 
Chrisman's emphasis on how 'ought' is an intensional operator and not a predicate. It 
seems possible that such a semantic distinction might reflect the fact our use of 'ought' 
fundamentally differs from representational terms (paradigmatically predicates) even if 
the semantic distinction does not consist in this difference. So perhaps the fact that 
'ought' is not a predicate provides evidence for its being used nondescriptively.  
 However, if one were to take this approach, then one would have to eschew talk of 
semantic properties, if semantics were not in the domain of the real. Again, however, 
there is some room for manoeuvre here. Consider, for example, Brandom's prosentential 
theory of truth, which is tied up with his general anaphoric account of semantic 
vocabulary (1994). Brandom argues the correct analysis of 'is true' reveals that it is not a 
predicate but a pro-sentence forming operator. On this picture, it is argued that 
                                                          
37 Thomasson (2014) goes so far as to argue that semantic deflationism is only plausible with 
ontological deflationism. 
38 Compare Wright's (1992) pluralist reconstruction of the realism/antirealism debate. 
39 See, for example, Macarthur and Price (2011). In later work, Price (2013) develops a more nuanced 
position in which he distinguishes i-representation, which is semantic representation, from e-
representation, which is covariation with an environment. 
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inflationism about truth is based on a misunderstanding of the correct logical form of 'is 
true'. However, this approach in many ways goes against the general spirit of 
deflationism by drawing metaphysical conclusions from semantic premises. Even 
Chrisman himself uses the sentence 'the joke is hilarious' as a plausible counterexample 
to the claim that all predicates refer to properties (2015: 10). Perhaps one could argue 
that the correct logical form of 'is hilarious' is not predicative, but this seems 
implausible. 
Finally, the kind of position being suggested here might look hard to distinguish 
from certain forms non-natural descriptivism. For it seems conceivable that there might 
be a descriptivist theory which denies that there is any answer to the grounding or 
constitutive question about semantics, yet nonetheless maintains that the semantics are 
robustly descriptive.40 I have already noted this possibility when I claimed that semantic 
deflationism does not strictly rule out a substantive metaphysics for semantic notions. 
Rather, it tells a story that aims to undermine the motivations for having one in the first 
place, and show the theoretical possibilities and payoffs of taking an anti-metaphysical 
stance to semantics. Moreover, it might be argued that the naturalistic credentials of 
deflationism make it the preferable approach. 
Again, I cannot address the question adequately here. These matters are best settled 
by examining each particular theory in detail and seeing what commitments it incurs 
and how it differs from other possible positions. Such matters raise a whole host of 
issues in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophical methodology 
generally. We cannot always expect to taxonomise philosophical theories in terms of yes 
and no answers to some fundamental question―do moral sentences express 
propositions? are moral judgments cognitive? are there any moral facts?―though no 
doubt these serve as helpful, perhaps indispensible, starting points in our inquiry. 
In this thesis I have tried to illuminate some of the starting points that one might take 
to developing a propositional nondescriptivism. However, while the overall aim has 
been general, the conclusions were reached from an examination of detailed attempts by 
other thinkers to forge the beginnings of such a position, even if perhaps this was not 
their primary goal. I hope to have shown that working out even the basic shape of a 
propositional nondescriptivism is a task far more complex than the initial 
characterisation of the approach might suggest. Nonetheless, I believe that our inquiry 
has shown that there are a wide array of conceptual resources available for challenging 
ingrained assumptions (perhaps dogmas) of the contemporary metaethical landscape. 
This might not be much, but one might take from this a cautious optimism for further 
inquiry.  
 
 
 
                                                          
40 c.f. Boghossian (1989). 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we examined the suggestion that propositional nondescriptivism might 
be achieved by formulating its central claims at the level of metasemantics, which 
provides general grounding explanations of semantics. It was argued that such a 
position does not imply nondescriptivism. We also saw how inferentialism might 
provide a more plausible nondescriptivist alternative to expressivism. It was suggested 
that metasemantic inferentialism might be combined with semantic deflationism to 
achieve propositional nondescriptivism. Some problems were raised both inferentialism 
and its combination with deflationism that would need to be answered by any such 
approach. 
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